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Abstract
In this work we introduce a model of default contagion that combines the approaches of
Eisenberg–Noe interbank networks and dynamic mean field interactions. The proposed conta-
gion mechanism provides an endogenous rule for early defaults in a network of financial institu-
tions. The main result is to demonstrate a mean field interaction that can be found as the limit
of the finite bank system generated from a finite Eisenberg–Noe style network. In this way, we
connect two previously disparate frameworks for systemic risk, and in turn we provide a bridge
for exploiting recent advances in mean field analysis when modelling systemic risk. The mean
field limit is shown to be well-posed and is identified as a certain conditional McKean–Vlasov
type problem that respects the original network topology under suitable assumptions.
Keywords: systemic risk; financial networks; mean field limit; default contagion; cascades;
heterogeneous interactions; core-periphery;
1 Introduction
More than a decade after the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the threat of contagious defaults
throughout the global financial system in 2008, systemic risk is still of vital importance to study.
Systemic risk is the risk of financial contagion, i.e., when the failure of one institution spreads to
others due to interlinkages in balance sheets both direct (e.g., via obligations) or indirect (e.g.,
via overlapping portfolios). The 2008 financial crisis demonstrated the magnitude of the costs
that systemic crises produce; this necessitates the design of models to consider stress testing of
financial institutions to improve regulation and mitigate the worst effects of a crisis.
In this work, we aim to bridge the divide between two, currently unrelated, modeling tech-
niques for financial contagion. That is, we will connect the Eisenberg–Noe network approach
popularized by Eisenberg and Noe [2001] to the more recent mean field approaches of systemic
risk. As the goal of this paper is primarily to highlight the overlapping notions between those
works, and demonstrate that the network models in fact converge to the mean field limit, we
will focus on simple, but realistic, financial settings that illustrate this point.
Briefly, there are two main contagion channels for systemic risk: (i) default contagion and
(ii) liquidity contagion.
(i) Default contagion occurs if the failure of one bank or institution to repay its debts in full
causes other banks to default triggering a chain reaction of failing banks. This occurs
through, e.g., a network of interbank obligations as studied in the seminal works of Eisen-
berg and Noe [2001], Rogers and Veraart [2013] in a static, network-based setting. More
specifically, in those works, the default of a bank causes direct impacts to the balance
sheets of other banks in the financial system. This loss of capital (potentially) causes
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other banks to default, thus spreading the original shock further throughout the financial
system. Such an event is denoted “default contagion” as the contagion is via default events.
(ii) Liquidity contagion occurs if the illiquidity of one bank or institution (as measured by,
e.g., the leverage ratio) causes other banks to also become illiquid. This occurs through,
e.g., a fire sale of assets; the liquidation of assets causes the prices fall, this harms the
leverage ratio of all other institutions via mark-to-market accounting thus causing further
liquidations. This has been studied in Cifuentes et al. [2005], Braouezec and Wagalath
[2019], Feinstein [2020].
In this work we will focus solely on default contagion. Utilizing just this notion of contagion
allows us to focus on the two main streams of literature mentioned above—namely balance
sheet constructed network models and dynamic mean field models—in order to compare them
and, ultimately, show that these at first sight divergent areas are, in fact, studying the same
phenomena.
The specific modeling assumptions undertaken in this work are chosen in order to capture
realistic financial networks that incorporate dynamic defaults that come as a random shock to
the system. This dynamic and stochastic default contagion is due to all banks holding assets
that evolve stochastically over time (in this work, often assumed to be a generalised geometric
Brownian motion) and having interbank contractual obligations with fixed repayment schedules.
Key to this construction is the realistic determination of default considered herein; as in real
financial systems, we impose that a bank enters default once it has negative capital (on its
balance sheet due to appropriate accounting techniques). We are primarily interested in how
these default shocks propagate through the system over time as a default contagion event.
Moreover, we are interested in how these events depend on the common exposures of the banks,
which we model through a common noise component of the external assets. Passing to the mean
field limit, the direct effects of the idiosyncratic noise are averaged out, while the propagation
of feedback effects from default contagion remains conditional on the common noise.
The remainder of this paper will be organized as follows. Section 2 provides a more detailed,
but succinct, overview of both the network-based models and mean field models for systemic risk.
It seems that such a combined literature review has not previously been attempted, so we hope it
can spark more interaction between these two areas of research in systemic risk; however, those
comfortable with this background can safely begin this work in Section 3. From here, Section 3
provides an extension of the dynamic network model of Banerjee et al. [2018] to include early
defaults based on the realised capital of the institutions. This section is studied with a finite
network of banks to provide understanding of the system dynamics and is novel on its own.
To illustrate the workings of our model, simple numerical examples are provided. Focusing on
a particular core-periphery setting, this model is extended in Section 4 to consider the limit
as the number of institutions becomes large. In so doing, we introduce a mean field model of
systemic risk directly built from the balance sheet approach, and we provide a simple numerical
simulation based on a concrete core-periphery example from Section 3. Finally, Section 5 is
dedicated to a more general mean field analysis of which the model in Section 4 is a special case.
This model and the associated mathematical results are the main contributions of this work. By
presenting both a finite network and mean field limit for the same systems, we are able to take
advantage of the positive aspects of both modelling frameworks, including the balance sheet
structure from the (finite) Eisenberg–Noe setting combined with the lower parameter space and
more concise mathematical results of the mean field approach.
2 Eisenberg–Noe and Mean Field Approaches to Systemic
Risk
2.1 Network Approaches
Network approaches to systemic risk consider a directed and weighted graph of interbank obli-
gations to determine the resultant clearing payments made between financial institutions. These
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networks determine the defaulting set of banks by finding exactly those institutions who do not
pay off their obligations in full when the network clears. A fundamental concept for such models
is the stylized banking balance sheet. By and large, these models provide a static snapshot of
the health of the financial system, though dynamics have begun to be included in select network
models; more details on these models will be provided herein.
The Eisenberg–Noe model. To fix the concepts, we will present first the Eisenberg–Noe
clearing payment system from the seminal work Eisenberg and Noe [2001]. In short, consider n
banks that make up the financial system, each with some initial endowment xi ≥ 0 for firm i.
Each firm additionally has liabilities to other institutions denoted by the total liabilities p¯i ≥ 0
for firm i and the relative obligations between two firms piij is given by the proportion of the
total liabilities of firm i owed to j. The realised payments p ∈ Rn that each firm makes is
obtained by the fixed point equation
p = p¯ ∧ (x+ Π>p) (2.1)
where a ∧ b := (min(a1, b1), . . . ,min(an, bn)) denotes the lattice minimum in the usual way.
One of the key strengths of this model is in its relation to a simple balance sheet that can be
calibrated to data, as undertaken in, e.g., Upper and Worms [2004], Mastromatteo et al. [2012],
Anand et al. [2015], Gandy and Veraart [2016] using, e.g., data from the European Banking
Authority.
Analysis of (2.1). The Eisenberg–Noe model for clearing payments inherently codifies three
key financial constructs:
(i) priority of debt over equity : a firm must first pay off its debts in full before it accumulates
any equity;
(ii) limited liabilities: no firm pays more than their contractual obligations; and
(iii) pro-rata repayment : there is no seniority structure of debt.
This last assumption, on pro-rata repayment, has been weakened to allow for varying seniority
structures and prioritized repayment in, e.g., Elsinger [2009], Feinstein [2019]. A fourth assump-
tion is also considered in the Eisenberg–Noe model, though it is relaxed in many subsequent
works. That is,
(iv) full recovery in default : a firm has no costs associated with defaulting on its obligations.
This was studied in Rogers and Veraart [2013], Glasserman and Young [2015], Weber and Weske
[2017] as a strict extension of the Eisenberg–Noe model. The model of Gai and Kapadia [2010]
can also be viewed as an extension (2.1) with 0 recovery in default, i.e., no payment is made in
case of default. Given that these financial constructs are all rules that define the value of assets
and liabilities, the Eisenberg–Noe model and its extensions are often described as a balance
sheet description of the financial system.
Mathematically, as the clearing payment problem inherent to the Eisenberg–Noe model is
a fixed point equation (2.1), the question of existence and uniqueness is of the paramount
importance. Under the first three financial constructs, and thus allowing for bankruptcy costs,
there exists a lattice of clearing payments via the application of Tarski’s fixed point theorem.
In particular, this implies that there exists a greatest clearing payment vector; such a payment
scheme would always be chosen as all institutions in the system have the greatest possible
equity under this scheme, i.e., it is the Nash equilibrium of all clearing payments. In addition,
if we introduce the fourth financial construct (full recovery of assets) then, under very simple
assumptions (e.g., all banks in the system hold some initial endowment), the clearing payment
is unique. In addition, in the Eisenberg–Noe setting, the sensitivity of the clearing payments to
changes in the system parameters has been studied in Liu and Staum [2010] for the endowments
and Feinstein et al. [2018] for consideration of the relative liabilities.
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The fictitious default algorithm, first presented in Eisenberg and Noe [2001], is used to
efficiently find the greatest clearing solution. Briefly, this algorithm initially assumes no banks
are in default and determines the clearing payments under such an assumption. If any banks
default in that scenario then in the greatest clearing solution they must also be in default.
Fixing only those banks as defaulting, a new clearing payment is computed under such a setting.
This process of checking for defaults and determining new clearing payments under fixed set
of insolvent banks is repeated until there are no new defaults. As the Eisenberg–Noe model
consists of finite number n of banks, this process is guaranteed to converge in at most n iterations.
Though this algorithm is efficient, and the underlying problem is mathematically well-structured,
analytical results are typically not feasible to provide.
Random graph approach. In order to obtain some analytical results in this network
framework, prior works consider passing to the n → ∞ limit of banks in the system. These
network asymptotics are considered in settings in which the interbank liabilities are described
by a random graph. The simplest random graph model is the Erdös–Rényi network in which a
fixed valued connection is made between any two banks based on a fixed probability. In many
of these asymptotic studies the model of Gai and Kapadia [2010] is utilised, i.e., there is no
recovery in case of default. Such an all-or-nothing payment setting leads to tractable formulae
for the probability of defaults in the graph. We refer to Hurd [2016], and references therein, for
a detailed survey of this random graph approach.
The analytical results from this random graph approach allow for further considerations
of system stability as well. For the finite network setting, systemic risk measures to determine
acceptable capital requirements for the entire financial system have been proposed in, e.g., Chen
et al. [2013], Kromer et al. [2016], Feinstein et al. [2017], Biagini et al. [2019b], but these objects
require Monte Carlo simulation for any computation. In contrast, Amini et al. [2016, 2012],
Amini and Minca [2016], Detering et al. [2019] are able to define a resiliency metric and determine
capital requirements for banks to make the system acceptable to regulators. This asymptotic
framework thus provides for simple comparative statics.
Dynamic network models of default contagion. Considerations given thus far are
solely in a static setting. However, banking balance sheets are highly dynamic and subject to
fluctuations due to, e.g., market movements. Indeed the conclusion of Eisenberg and Noe [2001]
gives a discussion of how to include multiple clearing dates and time dynamics, which has been
studied in Capponi and Chen [2015], Ferrara et al. [2016]. Additionally, Kusnetsov and Veraart
[2018] considers a similar approach to a financial model with multiple maturities.
As Capponi and Chen [2015] presented in a discrete time setting: A firm is liquid and
solvent at some time t if it has positive equity and has not previously been insolvent. Due to
the assumptions inherent in (2.1), if a firm is liquid then it must pay in full. A firm is illiquid
and solvent at some time t if it has negative cash account, but is able to obtain a loan to cover
its deficits, and has not previously been insolvent. As will be described in this work, and as
undertaken in Banerjee et al. [2018], Sonin and Sonin [2017], these loans will take the form of
rolling forward unpaid debts from solvent firms to their obligees. This is the key distinction that
cannot exist in the pure Eisenberg-Noe framework as there is no future time point to repay the
loan. Finally a firm is insolvent at time t if either it has negative equity or it was previously
deemed insolvent.
Most prior works on dynamic network models consider a discrete time setting Capponi and
Chen [2015], Ferrara et al. [2016], Kusnetsov and Veraart [2018]. As far as the authors are aware,
the only two extensions of the Eisenberg–Noe framework to continuous time are Banerjee et al.
[2018], Sonin and Sonin [2017]. Neither of those works considers the mark-to-market equity of
a bank in order to determine insolvency. That is the key innovation being provided in Section 3
of this work.
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2.2 Mean Field Approaches
In the dynamic mean field approaches to systemic risk, the starting point is to identify each bank
in a large financial system with some notion of its financial robustness or distance-to-default at
any given time. Next, the financial system is then modelled as a system of interacting stochastic
processes, whose values represent the current robustness. Typically, these models start from
some form of Brownian dynamics, but colloquially one could say that they are built on the
following premise: in contrast to a risk-neutral Black–Scholes world, the modelling of systemic
risk calls for room to play with the drift and other aspects of the coefficients, in a way that
takes into account the system as a whole.
A concrete particle system. To fix ideas, let us consider a particular system of n banks,
described by their distances-to-default Xi and corresponding default times
τi := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xi(t) < 0} for i = 1, . . . , n.
Letting Xτi (t) := Xi(t ∧ τi), a simple ‘structural’ model of systemic risk (inspired by Carmona
et al. [2015]) could then be based on dynamics of the form
dXτi (t) =
( θ
n
n∑
j=1
(
Xτj(t)−Xτi (t)
)
+ µ(t)
)
dt+ σ(t)dWi(t), t ≤ τi, i = 1, . . . , n, (2.2)
whereWi(t) =
√
1− ρ2Bi(t)+ρB0(t), for a family of independent Brownian motions B0, . . . , Bn.
Here ρ > 0 models the presence of a ‘common’ noise, namely B0, that captures exposure to
common risk factors, while θ > 0 incorporates an element of ‘herding’ in the drift that could, for
example, be the result of banks engaging in similar strategies and other interbank connections.
To capture systemic risk, the natural quantities in this model are the average distance-to-default
and the proportion of defaults given, respectively, by
Mn(t) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
Xτi (t) and L
n(t) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
1t≥τi .
Of course, an obvious weakness is the inherent symmetry in this model, and this is indeed a
central point to be addressed later in this work when we return to the Eisenberg–Noe approach,
as discussed in Section 2.1 above. For the purposes of this overview, however, we remain in the
symmetric setting.
Mean field analysis of (2.2). Sending n → ∞ in (2.2), one can hope to simplify the
analysis and simulation of the system, provided there is a law of large numbers effect. To see
that there is indeed such an effect, note that Mnt = 〈νnt , Id〉 and Lnt = 1− νnt (0,∞), where the
empirical measures νnt :=
1
n
∑n
i=1 1t<τiδXni (t) are tracking the surviving banks. From Hambly
and Søjmark [2019] it is then known that (νn,Mn,Ln) converges to a unique limit (ν,M,L),
where Mt = 〈νt, Id〉, Lt = 1−νt(0,∞), and νt has a density Vt which solves the nonlinear SPDE
dVt(x) =
σ2
2 ∂xxVt(x)dt− ∂x
(
[θ(M(t)− x) + µ]Vt(x)
)
dt− ρσ∂xVt(x)dB0(t), (2.3)
for x ∈ (0,∞), with an absorbing boundary condition at the origin, i.e. Vt(0) = 0. The distri-
bution of the limiting processes M and L can be used to give measures of systemic risk. For
example, one can track the probability of seeing changes in M and L above some threshold over
a short period of time. A simple observation is that, for larger θ > 0 and ρ > 0, the distribution
of the change in L over a given period becomes more concentrated at the extremes with banks
more likely to either survive or default together.
Translating (2.3) to the language of McKean–Vlasov SDEs, we haveM(t) = E[X(t)1t<τ |B0]
and L(t) = P(t ≥ τ |B0), where τ = inf{t ≥ 0 : X(t) ≤ 0} and
dX(t) =
(
θ(M(t)−X(t)) + µ)dt+ σd(√1− ρ2B + ρB0)(t). (2.4)
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This follows by an application of Itô’s formula, which shows that (2.3) is the (nonlinear) stochas-
tic Fokker–Planck equation for (2.4) absorbed at the origin, conditional on B0. That is, we have
E[φ(Xt)1t<τ | B0] =
∫∞
0
φ(x)Vt(x)dx for all φ ∈ C2b (R).
Building on the above, one could consider strategic interactions in (2.2) with costs and
controls depending on Mn and Ln. This would then yield a mean field game involving the limit
processes M and L. Without the common noise, a framework for this type of mean field game
has recently been developed in the two consecutive papers Campi and Fischer [2018], Campi
et al..
Mean field models of contagion. Recently, a new line of mean field modelling has
been proposed in Hambly et al. [2019], Hambly and Søjmark [2019], Nadtochiy and Shkolnikov
[2019a] aimed at studying default contagion in large financial systems. Based on a ‘structural’
approach, these models introduce an endogenous notion of contagion in systems such as (2.2), by
imposing that bankruptcies should cause a drop in the distances-to-default of the other banks.
Mathematically, this amounts in one way or another to incorporating the proportion of defaults
Ln into the dynamics, thus leading to positive feedback loops whereby defaults can shift other
banks into default. Variations of this approach and further theoretical results can be found
in Ledger and Søjmark [2018a,b], Nadtochiy and Shkolnikov [2019b]. Moreover, we note that
closely related approaches to contagion (in a dynamic but finite-dimensional setting) have also
been considered in Battiston et al., Lipton [2016].
In terms of numerical implementation, Kaushansky et al. [2018c], Kaushansky and Reisinger
[2019] have proposed and analysed numerical schemes for the mean field model of Hambly et al.
[2019], and it is noted in Kaushansky et al. [2018c] that a modified version of Lipton [2016] falls
within this framework. These developments can be seen as following on from Itkin and Lipton
[2017], Kaushansky et al. [2018a,b], where similar models are studied for systems of two or three
banks, and we note that passing to the mean field limit yields a way of alleviating the curse
of dimensionality arising from the couplings due (in particular) to mutual obligations in large
financial systems.
In this paper we will show how a variant of these ‘structural’ approaches to contagion is
intrinsically connected to a dynamic Eisenberg–Noe model with early defaults (as developed in
Section 3). Moreover, we will show (in Sections 4 and 5) that the associated mean field limit
can be derived and analysed rigorously by extending the techniques from Hambly et al. [2019],
Ledger and Søjmark [2018a,b].
The broader mean field literature on systemic risk. If, for simplicity, the con-
straints on the state space in particle system (2.2) are dropped, then the dynamics are precisely
those of the early papers Carmona et al. [2015], Fouque and Sun [2013], where Xi now denotes
the (logarithmic) cash-reserves of bank i and the mean-reversion models borrowing and lending
in the interbank market. In Carmona et al. [2015] these dynamics emerge as a Nash equilibrium
of a stochastic game (where drifts are controlled and it is costly to diverge from the mean) with
a variant of (2.4) without absorption arising as the equilibrium dynamics for the limiting mean
field game.
Starting from Fouque and Ichiba [2013], several other papers on systemic risk have studied
different versions of this mean-reverting setup (mostly without the common noise). These con-
tributions can be loosely grouped into: systems with stabilisation by a central agent Garnier
et al. [2013, 2017], games with delay Carmona et al. [2018], Fouque and Zhang [2018], games
with model uncertainty Huang and Jaimungal [2017], utility optimisation by the individual
banks and a central bank Maheshwari and Sarantsev [2017], methods for introducing hetero-
geneity Chong and Kluppelberg, Fang et al. [2017], jump-diffusion dynamics Bo and Capponi
[2018], Borovykh et al. [2018], Benazzoli et al. and connections to the theory of risk measures
Biagini et al. [2019a]. Still focusing on mean-reversion, constraints on the state space have
been considered via Feller type square root diffusions in Bo and Capponi [2018], Fouque and
Ichiba [2013], Shkolnikov and Ichiba [2013], Sun [2018] (with various additional features) and, in
such a framework, Capponi et al. [2019] has recently proposed a network structure with finitely
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many clusters of banks, where each cluster mean-reverts around different predetermined levels
modelling the presence of target leverage ratios.
In addition to the ‘structural’ approaches to contagion discussed earlier, there is a separate
literature on contagion in large financial systems, wherein defaults are dictated by exponential
clocks as in the ‘reduced-form’ approach to credit risk. This leads to more implicit notions of
contagion occurring at the level of the intensities. Firstly, Giesecke et al. [2013, 2015] propose
a system of interacting intensities that are self-exciting via dependence on the proportion of
defaults. Secondly, somewhat closer in spirit to (2.2), Ichiba et al. [2019] identifies the financial
health of each bank in a large system with a geometric Brownian motion, but with default
dictated by an exponential clock whose intensity can depend on the banks own health and
the average healthiness of the system. Contagion amounts to each default causing a drop in
the healthiness of the other banks by a random fraction, which in turn increases the default
intensities.
3 Dynamic Model of n Banks
As mentioned above, the primary goal of this section is to introduce a dynamic network model
to study default contagion in a finite system of banks. To do so, we seek to extend the dynamic
network model of Banerjee et al. [2018] to incorporate early defaults due to negative (accounting)
capital. This extension to include early defaults is novel and important in its own right. This
will be utilised in Section 4 to consider a comparison with a mean field limit. More details on
the reasons for undertaking that analysis are provided in Section 4, and we also refer to the
brief discussion in the introduction above.
This section is broken into two subsections. First, in Section 3.1, we describe the stylized
balance sheet of all banks in the system. This is used to define a general dynamic model for
default contagion in the vein of Eisenberg and Noe [2001], Rogers and Veraart [2013]. Second,
we simplify the parameters so as to study a specialized network setup that facilitates the later
analyses of this work. As the primary goal of this work is to merge the network and mean
field approaches in the literature, we find this specialized network setup is instructive. For the
analysis of this section, none of these additional assumptions are required for the theoretical
results.
Briefly, before undertaking the analysis, we wish to consider some notation utilised through-
out this work. Consider a financial system with n ∈ N financial institutions. This system does
not include the central bank or other financial entities not included within this system; we will
consider such an entity, called the “societal node” and denote it by node 0. Notationally, let
N = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of banks and N0 = N ∪ {0} include the societal node. As we are
considering a dynamic network model, consider a continuous set of clearing times T = [0, T ]
for some (finite) terminal time T < ∞. For simplicity, assume throughout this work that the
risk-free rate is 0 (r = 0). Finally, we will use the notation Z(t) for the value at time t ∈ T of
a process Z : T → Rn. We will now consider a model akin to the continuous-time setting of
Banerjee et al. [2018] in that we allow for liabilities to change over time and for firms to have
stochastic cash flows.
3.1 The Balance Sheet
In order to construct a continuous-time model we will begin by considering the stylized balance
sheet for a generic bank i ∈ N in our system. This balance sheet comes from a dynamic version
of Eisenberg and Noe [2001]. Throughout time, all assets are of only two types: interbank assets
and external assets. All liabilities are either interbank (and thus assets for another bank j ∈ N
in the system) or external and owed to the societal node 0.
In order to construct a continuous-time model we will begin by considering our network
parameters of cash flows and nominal liabilities. We will now consider a banking system with
stylized balance sheet as depicted in Figure 1.
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Balance Sheet @ t
Assets Liabilities
External (Mark-to-Market)
E[xi(T ) | Ft]
Interbank (Solvent)∑
j∈At Lji(T )
Interbank (Insolvent)∑
j∈N\At
(
(1−R2)Lji(τj)
+R2Lji(T )
)
Total∑
j∈N0 Lij(T )
Capital
Ki(t)
Figure 1: Stylized balance sheet for firm i ∈ N at time t ∈ T.
Let xi(T ) be the value of the external assets for firm i ∈ N0 at the terminal time T .
This will often be denoted in vector notation as x(T ). In mark-to-market accounting, at time
t ∈ T, these external assets should be valued in (risk-neutral) expectation, i.e., E[x(T ) | Ft] =
x(0)+
∫ t
0
dx(s)+E[
∫ T
t
dx(s) | Ft]. The value of the external assets can, equivalently be described
by the (marginal) cash flows external to the system, e.g., from depositors at the banks, as utilised
in Banerjee et al. [2018] for a dynamic version of Eisenberg and Noe [2001]. In this context, we
describe dx(t) to be the marginal change in the external assets at time t ∈ T, i.e., firm i ∈ N0
has incoming external cash flows
∫ t2
t1
dxi(t) between times t1 < t2. Throughout this work we
will take the external assets to follow a non-negative (Itô) process.
In contrast, we will assume the total nominal liabilities matrix L is a deterministic process
of time as these obligations are contractually generated and have fixed repayment schedule.
In other words, by looking at all outstanding contracts at time 0, the total amount that is
owed between any two institutions (and externally) up to any time can be determined exactly.
Generally we will consider dL(t) to be the marginal change in nominal liabilities matrix at
time t, i.e., the liabilities owed from time t1 to t2 are defined by
∫ t2
t1
dL(t) ∈ R(n+1)×(n+1)+ . By
assumption dLij(t) ≥ 0 for all firms i, j ∈ N0 as, without any payments made, total liabilities
should accumulate over time. Additionally, dLii(t) = 0 for all firms i ∈ N0 to remove the
possibility of self-dealing. This nominal liabilities matrix appears on both the asset and liabilities
side firms. The liabilities for firm i is the total amount owed over T, i.e.,
∑
j∈N0 Lij(T ) =∑
j∈N0
∫ T
0
dLij(s). To simplify notation, we will define dp¯(t) := dL(t)~1 for any time t ∈ T
to denote the marginal change in the total liabilities vector where ~1 = (1, . . . , 1)> ∈ Rn+1;
correspondingly, the total liabilities owed by firm i over T are given by p¯i(T ). The interbank
assets require consideration of historical price accounting since the interbank assets are generally
nonmarketable. As such, firm i ∈ N0 will give full value to all obligations (both past and future)∑
j∈At Lji(T ) =
∑
j∈At
∫ T
0
dLji(s) from solvent institutions At at time t; for insolvent firms
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j ∈ N\At, firm i will give full value up to the insolvency time τj ∈ T (discussed further
below), but only a fixed recovery rate R2 ∈ [0, 1] on obligations from j after insolvency, i.e.,∫ τj
0
dLji(s) +R2
∫ T
τj
dLji(s) = (1−R2)Lji(τj) +R2Lji(T ).
Assumption 3.1. The modeling assumptions expressed above can be summarized thusly:
(i) the external assets of each bank follow a stochastic process (which can be correlated to each
other) and (being marketable) are marked-to-market with risk-neutral measure P;
(ii) the interbank assets and liabilities are solely based on contracts written prior to time 0 and
have fixed repayment schedule; and
(iii) interbank assets (being nonmarketable) are valued using historical price accounting, i.e.,
priced at face value prior to a default event and reevaluated with the true recovery rate
after default.
These three key modeling assumptions lead to a contagion mechanism in which defaults come as
a shock to the system and cause a jump in the capital of any connected institution.
The shocks due to default outlined above are realistic since the interbank assets are non-
marketable. If, however, banks attempted a counterparty or network valuation adjustment (see,
e.g., Barucca et al. [2016], Banerjee and Feinstein [2019]) default shocks would still be expected
due to the assymetric and incomplete information available to the different banks. We also wish
to note that the historical price accounting rule undertaken herein provides the greatest possible
value for interbank assets and thus provides a bound on any other valuation system.
The balance sheet capital for firm i at time t ∈ T is exactly the difference on its balance
sheet between assets and liabilities, i.e.,
Ki(t) = E[xi(T ) | Ft] +
∑
j∈At
Lji(T ) +
∑
j∈N\At
[(1−R2)Lji(τj) +R2Lji(T )]− p¯i(T ). (3.1)
Insolvency for bank i occurs at the first time that it has negative capital, i.e.,
τi = inf{t ∈ T | Ki(t) < 0}
and the set of solvent firms at time t is given by At := {i ∈ N | τi > t}.
Remark 3.2. The stochastic structure introduced herein is necessary for consideration of early
defaults. Without it, the capital of banks would be deterministic and all defaults would be
known at the initial time 0. Though Banerjee et al. [2018] introduces a stochastic system for
financial networks, it does not consider endogenous early defaults. That is an innovation of this
work.
Remark 3.3. In the balance sheet approach considered herein, due to the full recovery of
interbank assets prior to default and a fixed recovery after default, the details of the Eisenberg–
Noe Eisenberg and Noe [2001] are only subtly utilised in the background. That is, the constant
recovery implies a pro-rata repayment scheme as in the Eisenberg–Noe framework; the difference
between this repayment scheme and that of Eisenberg–Noe and Rogers-Veraart Rogers and
Veraart [2013] is that recovery is on the liability side rather than the asset side. We take this
as a simplification to ease the discussion and mathematics to focus primarily on the stylized
contagion in this work.
Additionally, we can consider this balance sheet framework as akin to the dynamic network
models of Banerjee et al. [2018], Sonin and Sonin [2017], but adding in notions from the discrete-
time model of Capponi and Chen [2015] in which firms can default before the terminal time. In
that work there is a detailed discussion on an auction model for determining the recovered assets
in case of default from which the remaining debts are paid; this is in contrast to the simplified
exogenous recovery rates. If we take the approach from Banerjee et al. [2018] in which firms pay
off debts as they arrive and may have unpaid prior liabilities, the construction of the system
dynamics requires further considerations. Briefly, let Vi(t) denote the cash holdings of firm i
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Figure 2: A realisation of the 3 bank system described in Example 3.8 with a contagious default at t ≈ 0.6.
at time t ∈ T. Let piij(t) be the relative liabilities at time t. This is constructed in detail in a
continuous-time setting in Banerjee et al. [2018]; we refer to that paper for a detailed discussion
of the construction of the relative liabilities in this general setting. It is possible that a firm has
positive capital Ki(t) > 0 but insufficient funds to cover short term liabilities; in such a setting
we assume that the debts roll-forward when they go unpaid by a solvent firm as in Banerjee et al.
[2018], Sonin and Sonin [2017]. When a firm defaults, we consider a recovery rate R1 ∈ [0, 1]
on the unpaid previous debts and R2 ∈ [0, 1] on future obligations. As such we have the cash
holdings and (modified) capital equations at time t ∈ T as:
V (t) = xi(t) +
∑
j∈N
[(
Lji(t)− piji(t)Vj(t)−
)
1t<τj
+
(
(1−R2)Lji(τj) +R2Lji(T )− (1−R1)piji(τj)Vj(τj)−
)
1t≥τj
]− p¯i(t)
Ki(t) = Vi(t) + E[xi(T ) | Ft]− xi(t) +
∑
j∈N
(
piji(t)Vj(t)
− + Lji(T )− Lji(t)
)
1t<τj − [p¯i(T )− p¯i(t)].
Much of the results of this work can be undertaken in this setting with a liability structure
defined in Assumption 3.5. For simplification and from financial interpretation: we will be
interested in the setting where R1 = 1. We assume this from the idea that, prior to the default
even though a firm may be illiquid, it is solvent and thus some lender of last resort will guarantee
these obligations that rolled forward.
3.2 The Simplified Model
We will make the following assumptions for the remainder of this paper. These can be relaxed
as in Banerjee et al. [2018] and discussed briefly in Remark 3.3, but as the goal of this work
is to demonstrate a simple and clear comparison between a dynamic Eisenberg–Noe model and
default contagion in the mean field limit we will consider this simplification.
Assumption 3.4. Throughout this work we consider a short time horizon T model wherein the
liability repayment schedule is constant over time, i.e., dLij(t) = λijdt for i, j ∈ N0 with λii = 0
and λ0j(t) = 0, and L(0) = 0.
The constant nature of the network, as defined in Assumption 3.4, is valid for a short
time frame. Since financial crises occur over short time horizons, this fixed nature is therefore
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appropriate. Further, this allows us to study how the initial network topology can cause default
contagion and, ultimately, a systemic crisis.
For the remainder of this paper we will introduce the notation
L¯i(T ) :=
∑
j∈N0
[Lij(T )− Lji(T )] = Tλi0 + T
∑
j∈N
[λij − λji]
to denote the difference between obligations (external and interbank) and interbank assets.
Typically we will assume L¯i(T ) > 0 for all firms i, i.e., bank i has liabilities that cannot be
offset solely by interbank assets. Under such an assumption, every bank is a net borrower overall
(in the sense that total obligations are larger than interbank assets); this is true even if a bank
is not a net borrower in the interbank system.
Assumption 3.5. For simplification and ease of use, we will assume for the remainder of this
paper that the external cash flows follow (possibly time-dependent) correlated geometric Brownian
motions, i.e.,
dxi(t) = xi(t)[µi(t)dt+ σi(t)dWi(t)]
for vector of correlated Brownian motions W .
Under the setting of Assumptions 3.4 and 3.5, we can compute the capital process K(t)
from (3.1) as:
Ki(t) = xi(t)e
∫ T
t
µi(s)ds − L¯i(T )− (1−R2)
∑
j∈N\At
(T − τj)λji. (3.2)
In order to determine (3.2), we take advantage of the external assets following a geometric
Brownian motion to find E[xi(T ) | Ft] = xi(t)e
∫ T
t
µi(s)ds.
Assumption 3.6. We wish to assume that no banks are in default at time t = 0. This is
equivalent to bounding the initial external assets from below, i.e., xi(0) > T [λi0 +
∑
j∈N [λij −
λji]]e
− ∫ T
0
µi(s)ds almost surely for every bank i ∈ N .
Lemma 3.7. If Assumptions 3.4-3.6 are satisfied, there exists a greatest and least clearing
capital K↑ ≥ K↓ (component-wise and for every time t).
Proof. First, recall that the default times are defined by τi = inf{t ∈ T | Ki(t) < 0} for bank
i. The fixed point problem for the capital process K only depends on itself through the default
times τ . Now, consider the fixed point in the capital process. Note that as the capital process
K decreases the default times τ all decrease. Further, as banks default, the entire system’s
wealth drops as well since R2 < 1. With this, we are able to complete this proof through a use
of Tarski’s fixed point theorem.
Throughout the remainder of this work, we will focus on the greatest clearing solution K↑.
In the Eisenberg–Noe framework, this is computed using a fictitious default algorithm. Briefly,
such an algorithm assumes that at time t ∈ T, any bank that was solvent prior to t (At−) is
assumed to still be solvent; this is the best case scenario for all banks due to the downward
stresses from a default. Solvency (Ki(t) ≥ 0) of all banks is then checked under this scenario; if
no banks default we can move forward in time, otherwise any new defaults may cause a domino
effect of further defaults. In the case of defaults, we update the balance sheet of all solvent
firms to determine if this shock causes a cascade of failures. This sequential testing for new
defaults and updating the balance sheets continue until no new defaults occur. In practice this
algorithm is run using an event finding algorithm to determine the time of the initial default,
at that time the cascading defaults are determined until the system re-stabilises at a new set of
solvent institutions, and the stochastic processes evolve normally until the next default event.
This is demonstrated in Figure 2 where the insolvency of one bank causes another bank to
default as well. If desired, the least clearing solution K↓ could be found analogously with a
fictitious solvency algorithm instead.
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We wish to preview a consideration of the cascade condition of Section 4.3.1 and Section 5.3.1
which is a rule for determining the size of default cascades (tailored to our later reformulation
of the Eisenberg–Noe banking system as a stochastic interacting particle system). We do this
to highlight the similarity between this condition and the fictitious default algorithm widely
used in the (finite) network setting. Further, we wish to emphasise that, in the mean field
framework, a cascade needs to be defined more carefully, as liabilities between institutions are
infinitesimals and it is no longer meaningful to talk about defaults of individual banks. The
details underlying the definition of the cascade condition are provided in Section 5.2, and we
emphasise already here that the iterations of this cascade condition correspond analogously with
the fictitious default algorithm (see, in particular, Section 5.2.2 for the precise description of
the resolution of default cascades). As far as the authors are aware, a connection between the
fictitious default algorithm and the cascade condition presented herein, or its predecessors in
the mean field literature, has not previously been investigated.
We conclude this section with consideration of two numerical examples. The first is the
description of the small 3 bank system shown in Figure 2. We then consider a larger system
with a core-periphery structure. As noted in Craig and Von Peter [2014], Fricke and Lux [2015],
many real world financial systems exhibit a core-periphery structure.
Example 3.8. This example will be constructed to demonstrate the primary features of the
model, namely early defaults and the contagion thereof. Consider a n = 3 bank system over
a time horizon T = [0, 1] for simplicity. These banks are connected to each other through
interbank obligations
λ =
 0 2 2 12 0 2 1
2 2 0 1

where the last column denotes the obligations λ·0 to the societal node. These banks hold
identical, correlated external assets following the geometric Brownian motion dxi(t) = xi(t)[dt+
1
2dWi(t)] with correlations dWi(t)dWj(t) =
1
2dt for i 6= j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The initial value of these
external assets are chosen so that the initial capital of all banks is 1, i.e., set xi(0) = 2e−1 (which
results in Ki(0) = 1) for all banks i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. By setting the parameters in this way we satisfy
Assumptions 3.4-3.6. Finally, we fix the recovery rate for defaulted assets to be R2 = 0.1. One
realisation of this system is shown in Figure 2. In that realisation, bank 3 defaults due to its
own investments at time τ3 ≈ 0.6. This causes bank 2 to default at that time τ2 ≈ 0.6 as well
due to the shock to its own capital from re-marking its interbank assets. Bank 1 remains solvent
for the studied time frame T but a large negative shock is exhibited on its capital due to the
default of both banks 2 and 3.
The following example is a 10 bank system exhibiting the core-periphery structure. This net-
work topology is discussed in more detail in Borgatti and Everett [2000], Fricke and Lux [2015].
Of particular note, empirical studies (see, e.g., Craig and Von Peter [2014], Fricke and Lux [2015])
have demonstrated that real-world financial systems exhibit this structure. In undertaking this
study, two network structures will be considered: first, a highly connected networks with small
obligations from peripheral to peripheral institutions; second, we consider the same network but
with no obligations between peripheral institutions. The second, approximate, network has a
limit to its rank, i.e., the rank of the second network obligation matrix is bounded by twice the
number of core institutions. This approximating network, with a much sparser network, is more
tractable computationally and, as such, will be used to motivate a rank decomposition structure
in the mean field limit of the dynamic network model discussed within this section. For more
details, we refer to the next section.
Example 3.9. Consider a n = 10 bank core-periphery system with 2 core banks and 8 peripheral
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Bank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Full Network – 0.173 0.173 0.042 0.179 0.173 – – – 0.173
Reduced Network – 0.172 0.172 0.041 0.189 0.172 – – – 0.172
Table 1: Default times for institutions in Example 3.9 under a single realisation of the external assets. Normed
difference between these default times is 0.0097.
ones. These banks are interconnected with the (randomized) interbank liabilities
λ =

0 15.01 0 0 0 0 3.43 2.87 2.87 2.80
45.35 0 3.08 2.36 2.78 2.80 1.13 0.94 0.94 0.92
4.54 2.23 0 0.04 0 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0
5.90 2.90 0 0 0 0.06 0.07 0 0 0
4.67 2.29 0.05 0.04 0 0 0 0.05 0 0.05
4.40 2.16 0.05 0.04 0 0 0.05 0.05 0.05 0
3.64 4.47 0 0.04 0 0.05 0 0 0 0.05
3.41 4.18 0 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0 0 0.04
3.25 3.99 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.04 0 0
4.31 5.29 0 0.05 0 0 0 0 0 0

and all banks owe $1 to the societal node. As in real financial systems, there are sparse, and
small, obligations between peripheral firms. For a comparison, consider a reduced system of
obligations so that the obligations between peripheral firms are zeroed out, i.e.,
λˆ =

0 15.01 0 0 0 0 3.43 2.87 2.87 2.80
45.35 0 3.08 2.36 2.78 2.80 1.13 0.94 0.94 0.92
4.54 2.23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5.90 2.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.67 2.29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.40 2.16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.64 4.47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.41 4.18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.25 3.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.31 5.29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

.
This reduced system λˆ has rank 4 instead of full rank for the original network. In Table 1, the
default time for each bank is reported under the original (full) and reduced networks. Notably,
though these default times are not identical, they capture the general behavior quite accurately.
We will take advantage of this notion of the reduced system in the following sections.
In the next section, we start from the above example and discuss the mean field limit that
results from sending the number of banks to infinity in a suitable way.
4 A core-periphery mean field model
As already mentioned in the introduction of this paper, the main motivation for the present
section is theoretical in nature: the aim being to close a gap between the network literature
on systemic risk and recent mean field contagion models. Specifically, we will relate the finite
interbank system from Section 3 to a mean field limit described by a conditional McKean–
Vlasov problem akin to the problems studied in Hambly et al. [2019], Hambly and Søjmark
[2019], Ledger and Søjmark [2018a], Nadtochiy and Shkolnikov [2019b,a].
Aside from this theoretical perspective, there are several good practical reasons for studying
the mean field limit of the model proposed in Section 3. First of all, the mean field limit
rigorously facilitates a low parameter space, which can allow for a clearer identification of the
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main mechanisms at work, and which may serve as a vehicle for defining macroscopic events.
Secondly, the mean field limit can allow for more efficient numerical simulations by replacing
a large system of coupled SDEs with a single limiting object. Thirdly, one is unlikely to have
precise data for the liabilities matrix, but the mean field limit makes a rigorous case for working
with an approximate distribution. Finally, the lower parameter space can facilitate calibration
to the average of a large sample of banks, as opposed to the unfeasible task of fitting fully
heterogeneous parameters in the finite dynamic system.
In the present section, we focus on the financial motivation and thus restrict attention to
the core-periphery structure discussed at the end of Section 3. This leads us to introduce a
particular intuitive and tractable mean field point of view on the Eisenberg–Noe style interbank
system from Section 3. While we give a careful presentation of the mathematical results for the
mean field limit, along with a numerical example, the theoretical details are left to Section 5,
which treats a more general framework.
4.1 A simple model of core-periphery interbank networks
Before addressing the mean field setup, consider a finite financial system of size n = m0 con-
sisting of mc core banks and mp := m0 −mc peripheral banks, where the peripheral banks are
defined by not having any liabilities towards each other. In other words, the liabilities matrix
for the system can be written in the block form
λm0×m0 =
(
A B
C 0
)
=
(
Amc×mc Bmc×mp
Cmp×mc 0
)
. (4.1)
We could also work with sparse connections between the peripheral banks, but the idea here is
to keep the model simple and focus on the core-periphery interactions, so we simply zero out
the periphery-to-periphery interactions in line with the discussion in Section 3.2 above.
In general, the λij ’s can be completely different for each pair of banks (i, j), but it is natural
to suppose that they are nonetheless representative of some underlying structure in terms of
how the core and peripheral banks interact. One tractable way of capturing this is to declare
that
λij = (1 + i)(1 + δj)λˆij , (4.2)
where the (i, δi)’s are random samples from P ⊗ P , for some distribution P with mean zero
and support in [−1, 1] (or similar), and the λˆij ’s are the fixed entries of a nicer matrix λˆm0×m0 ,
which defines the underlying structure of the network. For concreteness, let us consider the
specific example
λˆm0×m0 :=
(
Aˆ Bˆ
Cˆ 0
)
:=

(
0 15
45 0
) (
0 · · · 0
3 · · · 3
)
2×mp,1
(
3 · · · 3
1 · · · 1
)
2×mp,2 5 2... ...
5 2

mp,1×2
0 0
 4 3... ...
4 3

mp,2×2
0 0

. (4.3)
In this case, there are two core banks (i.e., mc = 2) and the peripheral banks can be divided
into two groups (of size mp,1 and mp,2 with mp = mp,1 + mp,2) in terms of how they interact
with the core. Nevertheless, the real connections are subject to noise—modelled by (4.2)—and
hence λm0×m0 can feature much more asymmetry in the core-periphery interactions.
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4.1.1 Growing the number of banks to infinity
Starting from the above system of size m0, we now introduce a natural way of growing it to
infinity. Based on the ‘initializing’ system of size m0, for each m ≥ 1, the idea is to construct a
system of size n = mm0 according to the following procedure:
• multiply each of the mc core banks into m analogous entities (that can be seen as sub-
entities comprising a core bank of m times the size of the original), for a total of mmc core
entities
• multiply each of the mp peripheral banks into m analogous peripheral entities, for a total
of mmp peripheral entities
• let the external assets of each entity have an i.i.d. copy of the same initial condition as
well as the same drift and volatility as the original bank up to an i.i.d. noise.
• impose that the m sub-entities of a given core bank do not have liabilities towards each
other (which is enforcing no self-dealing within the core bank)
• impose that, up to noise, the liability positions between a given core and peripheral entity
are the same as those between the original core and peripheral bank only scaled by m−1
(meaning that the underlying network structure is preserved and, the noise aside, each
entity has the same total liabilities as the original bank of which it is a copy)
To be precise, starting from an underlying matrix λˆm0×m0 as in the example (4.3), we
construct the n = mm0’th system by first fixing the underlying network structure through the
mapping
λˆm0×m0 =
(
Aˆ Bˆ
Cˆ 0
)
7−→ λˆmm0×mm0 :=
1
m

Aˆ · · · Aˆ Bˆ · · · Bˆ
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
Aˆ · · · Aˆ Bˆ · · · Bˆ
Cˆ · · · Cˆ 0 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
Cˆ · · · Cˆ 0 · · · 0

, (4.4)
and then the liabilities matrix λmm0×mm0 is defined by setting
λij := (1 + i)(1 + δj)λˆij (4.5)
as in (4.2). Here the λˆij ’s are now the entries of λˆmm0×mm0 given in (4.4), and the (i, δi)’s are
random samples drawn from the distribution P ⊗ P , for a given probability measure P .
We stress that, due to the noise, the entries of λmm0×mm0 can be entirely heterogeneous
both across and within groups. In particular, a given sub-entity of the first core bank may
interact differently with all entities representing the second core bank, and any given core entity
may interact differently with all peripheral entities across the two groupings. Nevertheless, by
passing to the mean field limit we may hope to discover the underlying structure as defined
by the ‘initializing’ matrix λˆm0×m0 . The remaining subsections illustrate this for the specific
example provided by (4.3).
4.2 The dynamics of the finite interbank system
Returning to the Eisenberg–Noe model from Section 3, consider a finite system of size n, and
note that the capital (3.2) of each bank i = 1, . . . , n can be written as a coupled system
Ki(t) = xi(t)e
∫ T
t
µi(s)ds − L¯i(T )− T (1−R2)
∫ t
0
(1− sT )dLni (s), (4.6)
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where
Lni (t) :=
n∑
j=1
λji1t≥τj with τj = inf{t ≥ 0 : Ki(t) < 0}. (4.7)
For simplicity, we will assume that L¯i(T ) = TΛi for some constants Λ1, . . . ,Λn > 0, meaning
that, for each bank i, its total liabilities net of interbank assets over the period [0, T ] is given
by the positive amount TΛi. In particular, if a bank is a net lender in the interbank market,
then the surplus is more than offset by external liabilities, which is in line with what is observed
in practice. Recalling that each xi(t) is a geometric Brownian motion, it is convenient to work
with the following logarithmic ‘distances-to-default’ defined by
Xi(t) := log
{
xi(t) exp{
∫ T
t
µi(s)ds}
ΛiT + T (1−R2)
∫ t
0
(1− sT )dLni (s)
}
, (4.8)
for i = 1, . . . , n. This transforms the system (4.6)-(4.7) into the equivalent system
Lni (s) =
n∑
j=1
λji1t≥τj , τj = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xj(t) < 0}
dXi(t) = −σi(t)
2
2
dt+ σi(t)dWi(t)− d log
{
1 +
(1−R2)
Λi
∫ t
0
(1− sT )dLni (s)
}
Xi(0) = log{xi(0)} − log{ΛiT}+
∫ T
0
µi(t)dt,
(4.9)
where we recall that xi(0)e
∫ T
0
µi(t)dt > L¯i(T ) = ΛiT , by Assumption 3.6, which guarantees
Xi(0) > 0. Moreover, we will assume that the Brownian motions are only correlated through
a common noise, meaning that we can write Wi(t) = ρB0(t) +
√
1− ρ2Bi(t) for independent
Brownian motions B0, . . . Bn.
Since the default times τi are part of the equations for the distances-to-default Xi, one
has to be careful that there can be several solutions to (4.9) depending on how one decides
if a bank is in default at time t. For example, even if Xi(t9) > 0 for all the banks, one
may succeed in defaulting a few—or even all—of them at time t, provided the corresponding
increase of the Lni (t)’s make Xi(t) drop below zero for precisely the banks we decided to default,
where Xi(t) := Xi(t9)− {jump from increase in Lni (t)}. Moreover, if it is indeed the case that
Xi(t9) ≤ 0 for some bank i, then we need to decide (in a way that is consistent with the
equations) how this propagates as it may start a cascade of defaults at the same time t, for
which there can again be multiple possible choices (much in line with the previous example).
The solution we choose to work with here amounts to picking the solution that gives the
greatest clearing capital in the Eisenberg–Noe framework (see Lemma 3.7) with any instanta-
neous default cascades resolved by an analogue of the Eisenberg–Noe fictitious default algorithm.
In Section 5.2 we show how this corresponds to amending the particle system (4.9) with what
we call the cascade condition—see (5.12) for its precise definition and derivation, albeit in a
more general setting than the specific example considered here. This condition is intrinsic to
the particle system formulation of our interbank model, and it uniquely determines the loss
processes Lni at ‘time t’ given the state of the system immediately before, namely at ‘time t9’
in the sense of taking a left limit. In particular, this ensures that (4.9) has a unique strong
càdlàg solution, as argued in the proof of Proposition 5.5. We will not discuss this condition
any further here, but we briefly present its mean field analogue in Section 4.3.2 below.
4.3 The dynamics of the mean field limit
For any given m ≥ 1, and a fixed initial size m0, we will now consider the interbank system of
size n = mm0 modelled by (4.9), where the liabilities matrix and the other parameters are noisy
realisations of the underlying core-periphery network structure defined by the concrete example
(4.3). Specifically, we impose that:
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• the liabilities matrix λmm0×mm0 is constructed from (4.3) via random samples (, δ) from
the distribution P ⊗ P as outlined in the previous subsection.
• the i’th set of parameters (xi(0), σi, µi,Λi) is given as a function of the i’th random sample
δi, where the function is the same for all entities of the same type (out of the two core
types and two peripheral types defined by (4.3)).
Based on the analysis in Section 5, it follows that the system we just described has a well-
defined mean field limit as n → ∞ (see, in particular, Section 5.3.5). This limit captures the
coupled evolution of the four underlying types of banks (two core and two peripheral) after
averaging over the infinitely many entities within each type. Let I ⊂ [−1, 1] denote the support
of the distribution P , and let θ 7→ (σl,θ, µl,θ,Λl,θ) denote the parameter function for each of the
four types l = 1, . . . , 4. Let us say that l = 1, 2 are the two core types and l = 3, 4 are the
two peripheral types (in correspondence with mc = 1 + 1 and mp = mp,1 + mp,2 in (4.3)). To
simplify the presentation of the mean field limit below, we write
Yl,θ(t) := −
∫ t
0
σl,θ(s)
2
2
ds+
∫ t
0
σl,θ(s)d(ρB0(s) +
√
1− ρ2Bl(s)),
and
Cl,θ := (1 + θ)
1−R2
Λl,θ
,
for l = 1, . . . , 4, and θ ∈ I, where B0 and B1, . . . , B4 are independent Brownian motions.
As the number of banks grows to infinity (in accordance with Section 4.1.1), the results of
Section 5 below show that mean field limit of the finite interbank system is given by the coupled
McKean–Vlasov problem
L˜l(t) =
∫
I
∫ ∞
0
P(t ≥ τxl,θ | B0)V l0 (x | θ)dxdP (θ), τxl,θ = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxl (t) ≤ 0},
Xxl,θ(t) = x+ Yl,θ(t)− log
(
1 + Cl,θ
4∑
i=1
λ˜il
∫ t
0
(1− sT )dL˜i(s)
)
,
(4.10)
for l = 1, . . . , 4, where the strength of the core-core and core-periphery interactions are fully
captured by the simplified liabilities matrix
λ˜4×4 =

0 15 0mp,1 3mp,2
45 0 3mp,1 1mp,2
5mp,1 2mp,1 0 0
4mp,2 3mp,2 0 0
 , (4.11)
and V l0 (· | θ) are the initial densities for the distances-to-default of the four types l = 1, . . . , 4
conditional on θ ∈ I. See (4.17) below for how these initial conditions relate to the parameters
and the initial laws of the external assets.
Note that the contagion in (4.10) is no longer felt as the result of a single default event.
Instead, there are now four ‘infinite collections’ of entities (corresponding to the four underlying
types) who feel the contagion through the mutual exposures λ˜ij in relation to the proportion of
defaults within each infinite collection (given by the loss processes L˜l, for l = 1, . . . , 4). In the
McKean–Vlasov formulation (4.10), these proportions of default are really ‘average’ probabilities
of default for the entities of each type, but see also the SPDE formulation (4.12)-(4.13) below
which makes the interpretation in terms of proportions more explicit.
Remark 4.1. The relative number of core and peripheral entities are specified bym0 = mc+mp,
where mc = 2 and mp = mp,1 +mp,2. For a finite system of any size, the mc = 2 collections of
core sub-entities each comprise a fraction 1m0 of the system, while a fraction
mp,1
m0
makes up the
first collection of peripheral banks, and the final fraction mp,2m0 makes up the second collection
of peripheral banks. As a result, in the mean field limit we have that: (i) the core feels the
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contagion from a given proportion of defaults within the two peripheral groups at a strength
multiplied bymp,1 andmp,2, respectively, and, similarly, (ii) the peripheral groups feel contagion
from the core at a strength multiplied by mp,1 and mp,2.
4.3.1 Stochastic evolution equations for the densities
Consider, for simplicity of presentation, the case where P is a Dirac mass at zero (so θ drops
from the equations), meaning that there is no additional heterogeneity within each of the four
types (for practical purposes, one can think of having replaced the parameters by their mean
values averaged over P ). By applying Itô’s formula, and taking expectations conditional on
B0, we can reformulate (4.10) as a system of four coupled (nonlinear and nonlocal) stochastic
partial differential euqations (SPDEs). These SPDEs govern the (stochastic) densities of the
distances-to-default for the four infinite collections of banks of a given type (conditional on the
common noise B0). This is arguably the more natural point of view for the dynamics of the
mean field limit. Specifically, we have
L˜l(t) = 1−
∫ ∞
0
V lt (x)dx, for l = 1, . . . , 4, (4.12)
where V = (V 1, . . . , V 4) solves a coupled system of SPDEs on the positive half-line of the form
dV lt (x) =
σ2l
2
(
∂2xxV
l
t (x)− ∂xV lt (x)
)
dt−
4∑
i=1
λ˜ilfl(t)∂xV
l
t (x)dL˜i(t) + ρσl∂xV
l
t (x)dB0(t), (4.13)
with the Dirichlet boundary condition V lt (0) = 0, for each l = 1, . . . , 4. Note that this point
of view makes clear the precise nature of the contagion: namely a nonlinear transportation of
mass towards the origin, at a rate that is proportional to the current rates of default within each
infinite collection of banks (as mediated by the mutual exposures λ˜ij between the four infinite
collections). Indeed, in dt amounts of time, the proportion of defaults within the l’th collection
of banks is precisely dL˜l(t), since L˜l(t) gives the total loss of mass for the l’th collection of banks
up to and including time t (i.e., the accumulated proportion of defaults).
We note that, due to the irregularity in time of the common noise B0, the time derivative
of L˜l(t) does not exist if ρ > 0, but the process is increasing, so the integrals against it are
well-defined. Still, in order for the SPDE formulation (4.13) to make sense globally, as it is, we
are implicitly relying on each L˜l being continuous. As we already discussed above, this may be
violated, meaning that one (or more) of the loss processes L˜l can undergo a jump discontinuity,
corresponding to an instantaneous macroscopic default cascade within the infinite collection of
the l’th type (or types). Nevertheless, one can still attach a rigorous meaning to the SPDE,
as long as it is understood to only hold on the random intervals between jump times in the
following sense: at a jump time t, the densities are shifted according to the jump size, and thus
the system of SPDE is restarted from the new set of initial conditions
V lt (x) := V
l
t9
(
x+ Θl(t,∆Ll(t))
)
, x ∈ R+, (4.14)
where V lt9 is the pointwise left-limit of V ls as s ↑ t,
Θl(t, z) := log
(
1 + Cl
∫ t9
0
(1− sT )dLl(s) + Cl(1− tT )z
)
− log
(
1 + Cl
∫ t9
0
(1− sT )dLl(s)
)
,
and
Ll(t) :=
4∑
i=1
λ˜ilL˜i(t), for l = 1, . . . , 4.
Note that we must allow the Dirichlet boundary condition to be violated when restarting at a
jump time (and, as Remark 4.2 below points out, it is also a loss of the Dirichlet condition that
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leads to a jump). As concerns the timing and the sizes of the jumps, these are defined (in a
càdlàg fashion) by what we call the mean field cascade condition, namely
∆Ll(t) = limε↓0 limm↑∞∆
(m,ε)
t,l ,
∆
(m,ε)
t,l = Ξl
(
t, ε+ ∆
(m−1,ε)
t,·
)
, m ≥ 1,
∆
(0,ε)
t,l = Ξl(t, ε),
(4.15)
where
Ξl(t, z) = Ξl(t, z1, . . . , z4) :=
4∑
i=1
λ˜il
∫ Θi(t,zi)
0
V it9(x)dx.
This condition for the jumps is the mean field analogue of the cascade condition for the finite
system discussed at the end of Section 4.2. Intuitively, it amounts to subjecting the system
to an arbitrarily small shock that ignites a fictitious default cascade and then keeping track
of how it propagates in relation to the size of the initial shock: as we send the size of the
initial shock to zero, either the size of the fictitious cascade goes to zero, and there is then no
jump, or it converges to something positive, and this positive value is then the size of the jump
corresponding to a bona fide instantaneous default cascade. The mean field cascade condition
is carefully developed and motivated in Section 5. It is a special case of the condition (5.16) in
Section 5.3, which addresses a more general framework than the one considered in this section.
Remark 4.2. As we note in Section 4.3.2 below, the cascade condition gives ∆Ll(t) = 0 for
every l = 1, . . . , 4, whenever each left-limit density V lt9(x) vanishes as x ↓ 0. More generally,
there is no jump at time t provided Ξl(t, ) <  for small enough  > 0, for each l = 1, . . . , 4, as
follows by the same arguments as in Section 5.3.2. To see how this condition being violated can
lead to a jump, consider the case where, at some time t, we have∫ Θi(t,)
0
V it9(x)dx ≥ λ˜−1ij  and
∫ Θj(t,)
0
V jt9(x)dx ≥ λ˜−1ji , (4.16)
for small enough  > 0, for some pair of banks i, j ∈ {1, . . . , 4} with λ˜ij > 0 and λ˜ji > 0,
meaning that banks in the i’th and j’th groups are exposed to each other (with i = j being a
possibility, provided banks within the same group are exposed to each other in a way that is
significant in the mean field limit). Now suppose for a contradiction that ∆L(t) = 0. Then the
cascade condition implies that we can make limm↑∞∆
(m,ε)
t,· as small as we like (since it vanishes
as  ↓ 0). Thus, (4.16) together with the dominated convergence theorem gives
lim
m↑∞
∆
(m,ε)
t,i = Ξi
(
t, ε+ lim
m↑∞
∆
(m,ε)
t,·
) ≥ + lim
m↑∞
∆
(m,ε)
t,j ,
for small enough  > 0, and the same conclusion holds with i and j interchanged. Together,
these two inequalities yield a contradiction, and hence we conclude that there must indeed be
a jump. With (i, j) = (1, 4) this corresponds to the situation at the jump time in Figure 3.
Of course, there is nothing sacred about the size n = 4, and, unlike the particular interactions
in (4.11), we could in general have a nonzero diagonal, so i = j is perfectly valid if the core
sub-entities within a given collection are exposed to contagion from each other.
In order to better illustrate the dynamics of the mean field limit, we present a numerical
simulation of the system of SPDEs (4.12)-(4.13) with jumps governed by the mean field cascade
condition (4.15) via (4.14). The outcome is plotted in Figure 3, which shows a heat plot for
each of the four solutions (t, x) 7→ V lt (x) to the coupled system of SPDEs. The simulation
is performed using an adaptation of the numerical scheme proposed in [Ledger and Søjmark,
2018a, Sect. 4.2].
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Figure 3: The figure shows four heat plots for the distances-to-default of the four infinite collections (for a given
realisation of the common noise B0), where the horizontal axis is time, and the vertical axis is the distance-to-default.
The interactions are given by λ˜4×4 in (4.11) with mp,1 = mp,2 = 4, as in Example 3.9. The parameters are constant
(with ‘Periphery 1’ and ‘Core 2’ having a more positive drift), and the initial conditions can be read off the heat plots
at time t = 0. The common noise starts out on a slight negative trend, which instigates a default cascade between
the low performing fractions of ‘Core 1’ and ‘Periphery 2’, resulting in both fractions defaulting in their entirety.
Moreover, these defaults spill into a severe downgrading of the financial health of ‘Core 2’. However, ‘Core 2’ was
otherwise performing well, so only a very small proportion of it defaults, and since ‘Periphery 1’ is only exposed to
defaults in ‘Core 2’, this means that these events have no significant impact on ‘Periphery 1’.
In terms of the related mathematical literature, we stress that the papers Delarue et al.
[2019], Hambly et al. [2019], Ledger and Søjmark [2018a,b], Nadtochiy and Shkolnikov [2019a] are
focused on ‘one-dimensional’ variations of McKean–Vlasov problems akin to (4.10), whereas the
recent paper Nadtochiy and Shkolnikov [2019b] studies a coupled system analogous to (4.10) with
only minor differences. In particular, Nadtochiy and Shkolnikov [2019b] provides an existence
result based on a Schauder fixed point argument (but no results on uniqueness) and studies
criteria under which any solution to the system must incur a blow-up. However, unlike the
present paper, the results in Nadtochiy and Shkolnikov [2019b] neither address the relation to
a finite particle system, nor do they consider a condition for uniquely specifying the jump sizes
(in contrast to our cascade condition).
4.3.2 On the ruling out of instantaneous default cascades
Due the averaging effect of passing to the mean field limit, one could reasonably expect the
limiting loss processes L˜l to evolve continuously, and anything else would be somewhat surprising
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given that the McKean–Problem is driven by continuous Brownian dynamics. In many cases,
it will indeed be true that the system evolves continuously. However, as we have just seen in
Figure 3, depending on the parameters, one or more of the loss processes may see their speed
of increase diverge to infinity in a way that results in a jump discontinuity (see also [Ledger
and Søjmark, 2018a, Thm. 2.7] in a simplified setting). Naturally, such an event can be seen as
defining an instantaneous ‘macroscopic’ default cascade that survived the passage to the mean
field limit.
In order to decide whether the solution is continuous or not, and in order to specify the size of
a potential jump, we must amend (4.10) with the mean field cascade condition introduced above.
As already mentioned, the details of this are reserved for Section 5, however, it is worth taking
a few moments to preview a simple result on when jumps can be ruled out, which illustrates the
workings of the cascade condition.
Section 5.3.2 presents a simple criterion for the initial densities that rules out a jump immedi-
ately after initializing the system. As above, we consider the case where there is no dependence
on θ, and note that the initial densities are then of the form
V l0 (x) = v
l
0
(
ΛlTe
− ∫ T
0
µl(s)dsex
)
ΛlTe
− ∫ T
0
µl(s)dsex, for x > 0, (4.17)
where vl0 is the initial density for the external asset process of banks of type l (which is supported
on x > ΛlTe−µlT ). If, for every l = 1, . . . , 4, there is a small l > 0 such that
(1−R2)T
4∑
j=1
λ˜jlv
l
0(x)e
−µlT < 1, for all x ∈ (ΛlTe−µlT ,ΛlTe−µlT + l), (4.18)
then there is not an instant jump at time t = 0 and the solution remains continuous for a small
amount of time after initialization.
Remark 4.3. If each x 7→ vl0(x) is continuous near the boundary x = ΛlTe−µlT and vl0(x)
vanishes as x ↓ ΛlTe−TµlT , then clearly (4.18) is satisfied. However, if vl0(x) converges to
something strictly positive as x ↓ ΛlTe−µlT , then the values of the parameters become decisive.
At any given time t ≥ 0, the mean field cascade condition (5.16) gives the precise criterion
for whether or not there is a jump, and what the size of the jump is, if there is one. However,
here we only note that there is a simple (non-optimal) time-t analogue of (4.18) for ruling out
jumps at any given time t and in some short time interval thereafter. To see what this looks
like, let V l be given by (4.13); that is, V ls (x) denotes the density of solvent banks of type l
with distance-to-default x at time s, for a fixed realisation of the common noise B0. If, for each
l = 1, . . . , 4, there is a small l such that
(1−R2)(T − t)
4∑
j=1
λ˜jlV
l
t9(x) < 1, for all x ∈ (0, v),
then there is no jump at time t and the solution is guaranteed to remain continuous for a short
time thereafter. Note that the criterion involves the left limit V lt9(x) = lims↑t V ls (x), meaning
that it is based on the state of the system strictly before time t (where the state of the system
is given by the distance-to-default densities for the solvent banks of the four types). The reader
is referred to Section 5.3 for further details.
5 Convergence and well-posedness of the mean field
Recall that we transformed the capital (3.2) of each bank into an interacting particle system
(4.9) based on the notion (4.8) of their logarithmic distances-to-default. The remaining part of
the paper is dedicated to a careful analysis of this particle system and its mean field limit. In
relation to the previous section, we carry out the analysis under a more general assumption on
the coefficients and the structure of the liabilities matrix (as n→∞). We then show in Section
5.3.5 how to obtain the core-periphery model of Section 4 as a special case of this framework.
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5.1 The finite interbank system
To streamline the presentation, we will work with a general version of the system of interacting
distances-to-default (4.9). That is, we will focus on general particle systems of the form
Xi(t) = Xi(0)−
∫ t
0
bi(s)ds+
∫ t
0
σi(s)dWi(s)− F
(∫ t
0
g(s)dLni (s)
)
Lni (s) =
n∑
j=1
λji1t≥τj , τj = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xj(t) ≤ 0},
(5.1)
where each Xi denotes the distance-to-default of ‘bank i’ as derived from the expression for
bank i’s capital (3.1) in the dynamic Eisenberg–Noe framework of Section 3. We recall that
the transformation from (3.1) to an interacting system of distances-to-default was carried out
in Section 4.2. The precise assumptions for the particle system are outlined in what follows.
First of all, we will assume that, for large n, the rank of the liabilities matrices λn×n is
bounded by some value k (uniformly in large n > k). Then, for large n > k, we have a
factorization of the form
nλn×n = Un×kVk×n. (5.2)
Here the natural choice of factorization comprises the matrices Un×k := (u˜ij) and Vk×n := (ςiv˜ij)
built from the singular value decomposition nλn×n = U˜diag(ς)V˜ , where diag(ς) is the n × n
diagonal matrix with the singular values ς1, . . . , ςn on the diagonal (out of which no more than
the first k values are nonzero, since the rank is bounded by k).
Spectral decompositions and low rank structures are omnipresent in statistical analysis and
the applied sciences more generally. In relation to financial networks and systemic risk, simple
aspects of this has, e.g., been utilised in contagion models Amini and Minca [2016], Cont and
Schaanning [2019] and statistical methods for detecting core-periphery network structures Cu-
curingu et al. [2016]. More recently, the preprint Spiliopoulos and Yang [2019] studies a reduced
form model for default clustering (based on interacting default intensities), using a singular
value decomposition of the adjacency matrix in a way that is completely analogous to what
we do here; namely to study the large population limit of the system under a bounded rank
assumption which allows for a more tractable reformulation of the interactions.
Example 5.1. Suppose the liabilities matrix λn×n is constructed from an underlying matrix
λˆm0×m0 , as in (4.4)–(4.5), where λˆm0×m0 is of the block form (4.4). Then the rank of λˆm0×m0
is at most 2m0, and one easily verifies that the rank of λn×n also stays bounded by 2m0 for any
system of size n = mm0, for all multiples m ≥ 1. This yields a particular example where the
rank remains bouned as n → ∞. We return to this in Section 5.3.5, where we detail how the
model in Section 4 appears as a special case of the analysis presented here.
Note that (5.2) amounts to
nλij =
k∑
l=1
uilvlj , for every i, j = 1, . . . , n,
where uil is (i, l)-entry of Un×k and vlj is the (l, j)-entry of Vk×n. Based on this, the utility of
(5.2) lies in the simple fact that we can now decompose the processes Lni from (4.7) as
Lni (t) =
k∑
l=1
vliLnl (t), where Lnl (t) :=
1
n
n∑
j=1
ujl1t≥τj , for i = 1, . . . , n. (5.3)
Crucially, these new loss processes Lnl , for l = 1, . . . , k, do not depend on i and, equally impor-
tant, the number of them, namely k, is fixed as n→∞.
In order to make precise the financial meaning of (5.3), we interpret the entries of Un×k and
Vk×n as latent factors identifying k underlying channels of contagion in the network structure
(independently of the size n):
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• ujl captures how strongly bank j contributes to the contagion of channel l, and
• vli captures how exposed bank i is contagion from channel l
Let u1, . . . ,un ∈ Rk denote the n row vectors of Un×k and v1, . . . ,vn ∈ Rk denote the n
column vectors of Vk×n. That is,
ui := (ui1, . . . , uik) and vi := (v1i, . . . , vki), for i = 1, . . . , n. (5.4)
Then bank i is characterized by the pair of k-dimensional vectors ui and vi, detailing, respec-
tively, how it contributes to each of the k (latent) channels of contagion and how it is impacted
by them. Nevertheless, once we have identified the k channels of contagion, the vector vi alone
can be seen as identifying bank i in terms of how it is hit by contagion: if two banks have similar
vi’s, they are similar in this crucial sense (although they may of course be dissimilar in terms
of how strongly they contribute to contagion overall and to each of the various channels).
Remark 5.2. In Section 4 we considered a specific core-periphery structure where the peripheral
groups could be identified strictly by how they interact with the core (via the underlying matrix
λˆm0×m0). In practice, the interbank liabilities may comprise a perturbation of this structure
which is more heterogeneous (in addition to the noisiness) but nonetheless still of low rank
(e.g. due to asymmetric but sparse periphery-to-periphery connections). Thus, we may not have
a small number of clear-cut groups as in Section 4, but the low rank (uniformly in n) would still
allow the system to be decomposed into a small number of latent channels of contagion.
Relying on the decomposition (5.3), the particle system (5.1) is transformed to take the form
Xi(t) = Xi(0) +
∫ t
0
bi(s)ds+
∫ t
0
σi(s)dWi(t)− F
( k∑
l=1
vli
∫ t
0
g(s)dLnl (s)
)
Lnl (t) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
ujl1t≥τj , τj = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xj(t) ≤ 0}, l = 1, . . . , k.
(5.5)
Here, and it what follows, we assume that the Brownian motions W i are correlated through
a single common Brownian motion. That is, for each i = 1, . . . , n, we have Wi(t) = ρB0(t) +√
1− ρ2Bi(t) for a family of independent Brownian motions B0, . . . , Bn. In terms of the coeffi-
cients in (5.5) we impose the following structural conditions which are motivated by the desire
to include the original system (4.9) and keep the analysis as simple as possible.
Assumption 5.3. F is Lipschitz continuous and increasing with F (0) = 0, while g is continu-
ous, non-negative, and decreasing. Furthermore, the asymmetry of the drifts and the volatilities
is of the form bi(s) = bui,vi(s) and σi(s) = σui,vi(s). Finally, bu,v and σu,v are deterministic
functions of time, and we ask that |ρ| < 1 and  ≤ σu,v ≤ −1, for a uniform constant  > 0, as
well as ρσu,v ∈ Cκ(R), for some κ > 1/2.
Recall that the pair of k-dimensional vectors ui and vi from (5.4) characterize bank i in
relation to interbank contagion. Together with the (random) initial conditions Xi(0), for i =
1, . . . , n, this describes the asymmetry in the interbank market. In order to obtain something
meaningful as the number of banks goes to infinity, we need to impose some structure through
the convergence of their joint empirical measures defined by
$n :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
δui ⊗ δvi ⊗ δXi(0), for n ≥ 1. (5.6)
Assumption 5.4. First of all, we assume |ui| + |vi| ≤ C, for some C > 0, uniformly in
i = 1, . . . , n and n ≥ 1. Secondly, we ask that each (ui,vi, Xi(0)) is independent of the driving
Brownian motions. Thirdly, we ask that $n converges weakly to a probability measure $ ∈
P(Rk × Rk × R+), which we write as a joint law $ = Law(u,v, X(0)) with d$(u, v, x) =
dν0(x|u, v)d$ˆ(u, v), where $ˆ = Law(u,v) and ν0(·|u, v) is the regular conditional law of X(0)
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given (u,v) = (u, v). Finally, letting S(u) := supp(Law(u)) and likewise for v, we assume S(u)
and S(v) are compact, and that for any v ∈ S(v) we have ∑kl=1 ulvl ≥ 0 for all u ∈ S(u), as in
the finite system of size n where
∑k
l=1 ulvl = nλij ≥ 0 for every u = ui and v = vj.
As we already pointed out in Section 4.2, the particle system (5.5) needs to be amended with
a condition for how to resolve defaults (that is consistent with the equations and corresponds
to the greatest clearing capital solution in Lemma 3.7). This is achieved by insisting on the
cascade condition (5.12) which is the subject of the next subsection (Section 5.2).
Proposition 5.5 (Well-posedness of the particle system). Let Assumption 5.3 be in place.
Equipped with the cascade condition (5.12), as defined in Section 5.2 below, the system (5.5) has
a unique strong càdlàg solution.
Proof. Up until the first default time, the system trivially has a unique strong solution that is
continuous in time. Since we insist on the cascade condition (5.12), the number of defaulting
banks at the first default time is uniquely specified, and this then uniquely determines how to
restart the system. Defining the solution recursively, for each of at most n stopping times, we
obtain a unique strong solution with càdlàg paths.
5.2 Characterizing the size of default cascades
In this section we make precise when the loss processes Lnl (t) should jump and what the size
of each jump should be given the possibility of a default cascade—that is, when the default
of one bank immediately forces more banks into default at the same instance of time. This
takes some care in order to ensure the consistency with the system (5.5), but ultimately the
situation is resolved by identifying the correct fixed point of an iterated mapping (as presented in
Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.1). At first sight, the notation we introduce may appear a little abstract,
but it leads to the convenient formulation (5.12) of what we call the cascade condition, which
characterizes the jump sizes of the particle system in an intrinsic way, and which guides the
identification of the analogous condition for the mean field limit. As discussed in Section 3.2,
this cascade condition is conceptually related to the fictitious default algorithm of Eisenberg
and Noe [2001].
Fix n ≥ 1 and consider the mapping from the type vector vi to the total losses felt by bank
i given by
vi 7→ Lnvi(t) :=
k∑
l=1
vliLnl (t), for i = 1, . . . , n.
Recalling the decomposition (5.3), we simply have Lnvi(t) = L
n
i (t), but the point is to isolate how
the asymmetric i-dependence arises strictly as a function of the vector vi (whose k components
capture how significant banks of ‘type’ l = 1, . . . , k are to bank i). Notice that, while each
t 7→ Lnl (t) in principle need not be increasing (depending on the rank factorization), the full
process t 7→ Lnvi(t) = Lni (t) is by definition increasing.
Given a càdlàg path t 7→ η(t), we write ∆η(t) := η(t)− η(t9). Then we can observe that, at
any time t ≥ 0, the jump sizes of the loss processes must satisfy
∆Lnl (t) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
uil1t=τi =
1
n
n∑
i=1
uil1{Xi(t9)∈[0,∆Fni (t)]}1t≤τi , (5.7)
for each l = 1 . . . , k, where ∆Fni (t) is the amount by which the i’th distance-to-default (or
particle) is shifted down at time t (due to losses from defaults at time t), namely
∆Fni (t) := F
( k∑
j=1
vji
∫ t9
0
g(s)dLnj (s) + g(t)∆Lnvi(t)
)
− F
( k∑
j=1
vji
∫ t9
0
g(s)dLnj (s)
)
.
Consequently, once we have identified the correct sizes of the jumps ∆Lnvi(t), for i = 1, . . . , n, all
the jump sizes ∆Lnl (t), for l = 1, . . . , k, are automatically uniquely specified by (5.7). Indeed, the
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events {t ≤ τi} and the values
∫ t9
0
g(s)dLni (s), for i = 1 . . . , n, are all fixed at time t, since they
are given as left-limits of the evolution of the system strictly before time t. On the other hand,
the values ∆Lnvi(t) are to be determined at time t, and they will involve a choice, amounting to
how we choose to resolve default cascades.
5.2.1 Fixed point constraints and the cascade condition
As for Lnvi(t) above, it is important to realise that the i-dependence of ∆F
n
i (t) is again a function
of vi alone. In order to make this clear (and to streamline the mathematical presentation), we
introduce the random map Θ : R+ × (R+)Rk × Rk → R+ given by
Θ(t; f, y) := F
( k∑
j=1
yj
∫ t9
0
g(s)dLnj (s) + g(t)f(y)
)
− F
( k∑
j=1
yj
∫ t9
0
g(s)dLnj (s)
)
. (5.8)
Clearly, we then have ∆Fni (t) = Θ(t; ∆L
n,vi), so we can rewrite (5.7) as
∆Lnl (t) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
uil1{Xi(t9)∈[0,Θn(t;∆Ln,vˆi)], t≤τi}, l = 1 . . . , k. (5.9)
As already alluded to above, this shows that: once we pin down the mapping v 7→ ∆Lnv, then
the correct jumps of Ln1 , . . . ,Lnk are automatically specified by the constraint (5.9).
Looking at (5.9), we immediately obtain a constraint for v 7→ ∆Lnv by simply summing over
l = 1, . . . , k weighted by the vil’s, which yields the identity
∆Lnvi(t) =
k∑
l=1
vli
(
1
n
n∑
j=1
ujl1{Xj(t9)∈[0,Θn(t,∆Ln,vj)], t≤τj}
)
, i = 1, . . . , n. (5.10)
Note that this is precisely saying that v 7→ ∆Lnv arises as a fixed point Ξ(t; ∆Ln, ·) = ∆Ln(·)(t),
where the random map Ξ : R+ × (R+)Rk × Rk → R+ is defined by
Ξ(t; f, x) :=
k∑
l=1
xl
(
1
n
n∑
j=1
ujl1{Xj(t9)∈[0,Θ(t;f,x)], t≤τj}
)
. (5.11)
However, the mapping f 7→ Ξ(t; f, ·) can have multiple fixed points, so the above fixed point
constraint alone is not enough to determine the jump sizes ∆Ln. That is, the system (5.5) is a
priori ill-posed without a selection rule.
Based on the natural step-by-step resolution of default cascades (explained in detail in Sec-
tion 5.2.2 below), the correct selection rule simply amounts to a (suitably initialized) iterative
application of the mapping Ξ. This can be formulated succinctly as∆L
n
v(t) := lim
m→n∆
m
t,v for v = v1 . . . ,vn,
∆mt,v := Ξ(t,∆
m−1
t,v ,v) and ∆0t,v := Ξ(t; 0,v),
(5.12)
which we will refer to as the cascade condition for the jump sizes. As concerns the notion of a
step-by-step resolution, the number of ‘steps’ or ‘rounds’ in the cascade is given by the smallest
m¯ such that limm→n ∆mt,· = ∆m¯t,·. For clarity, further details on this are presented in the separate
Section 5.2.2 below, where we give a precise mathematical definition of instantaneous default
cascades leading to this condition.
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5.2.2 Detailed description of the resolution of cascades
Let At9 denote the (random) set of indices i ≤ n such that t ≤ τi for each i ∈ At9, meaning that
bank i was (and may still be) solvent—or more colloquially, ‘alive’—strictly before time t. Note
that there is at least one default at time t precisely when Xi0(t9) = 0 for some bank indexed
by i0 ∈ At9. Therefore, we define the (random) set of indices D0t as precisely those i ∈ At9
for which Xi(t9) = 0, corresponding to the initial set of defaults at time t (which came about
without any role played by contagion).
Supposing that D0t 6= ∅, we now need to make it mathematically precise how to decide if a
cascade is initiated by the contagious effects from these initial defaults—and then we need to
make precise how to resolve the total size of the cascade if it occurs.
Recalling the definition of Ξ in (5.11), the isolated effect of the initial defaults (which we
recall are indexed by D0t ) is to increase each Lnvi(t9) by an initial jump of size
∆0t,vi := Ξ(t; 0,vi) =
1
n
k∑
l=1
vli
∑
j∈D(0)t
ujl, for i = 1, . . . , n.
Next, we define the (random) set of indices D1t ⊂ At9/D0t as precisely those i ∈ At9/D0t for
which
Xi(t9)−Θ(t; ∆0t,(·),vi) ≤ 0.
In other words, the members of D1t are precisely those banks that enter into default at time t
on account of the contagion from the initiating set of defaults D0t . Supposing that D1t 6= ∅, we
must update the losses to include this first round of contagion, and check if this induces another
round of contagion. This amounts to considering a jump in Lnvi(t9) of size
∆1t,vi := Ξ(t; ∆
0
t,(·),vi) =
1
n
k∑
l=1
vli
∑
j∈D0t∪D1t
ujl, for i = 1, . . . , n,
and thus defining D2t ⊂ At9/D1t as precisely those i ∈ At9/D1t for which
Xi(t9)−Θ(t; ∆1t,(·),vi) ≤ 0.
For anym ≤ n, ∆mt,(·) and Dmt are defined analogously. Recalling that n−1
∑k
l=1 vliujl = λji ≥ 0,
it is always the case that
∆mt,(·) = Ξ(t; ∆
m−1
t,(·) , ·) ≥ ∆m−1t,(·)
in the pointwise sense. In particular, each (∆mt,v) is an increasing sequence in m = 0, 1, . . . , n,
and it is immediate that Dm¯t = ∅ implies
Ξ(t; ∆m¯t,(·),v) = ∆
m¯
t,v, for all v = v1 . . . ,vn,
so the sequence eventually reaches a fixed point after the m¯’th round of contagion-induced
defaults (since there are only n banks in total, note that we must have Dnt = ∅). Once a fixed
point is reached at the m¯’th iteration, there are no further defaults, and hence the default
cascade is fully resolved with
∆Lnv(t) := ∆
m¯
t,v =
k∑
l=1
vli
∑
j∈D0t∪···∪Dm¯t
ujl, for v = v1, . . . ,vn.
By construction, each sequence (∆mt,v) stays fixed after this m¯’th iteration, so the value ∆L
n
v(t)
is indeed the limit of ∆mt,v as m→ n, in agreement with the cascade condition defined in (5.12).
This formulation of the jump size as a limit of iterated steps in the default cascade is instructive
for the formulation of the mean field analogue, which follows in the next subsection.
Remark 5.6. If all banks have interbank liabilities, then, for any j, there is an i such that
λji > 0. Hence, we get Dmt 6= ∅ if and only if Ξ(t; ∆mt,·,v) ≥ ∆mt,v for all v ∈ {v1 . . . ,vn} and
Ξ(t; ∆mt,·,v) > ∆mt,v for at least one v ∈ {v1 . . . ,vn}.
26
5.3 The mean field limit
Provided there is a suitable averaging effect, we can send n → ∞ in the particle system (5.5)
and thereby capture the ‘systemic’ or macro-level properties of the finite system through its
mean field limit. As we show in Appendix A.3, the insistence on Assumptions 5.3 and 5.4 is
sufficient to ensure such a law of large numbers, and it then follows that the resulting mean field
limit is given by a McKean–Vlasov problem of the form
Ll(t) =
∫
R+×Rk×Rk ulP(t ≥ τxu,v | B0)d$(x, u, v), l = 1, . . . , k,
τxu,v = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxu,v(t) ≤ 0},
Xxu,v(t) = x+
∫ t
0
bu,v(s)ds+
∫ t
0
σu,v(s)dWs − F
(∑k
l=1 vl
∫ t
0
g(s)dLl(s)
)
,
(5.13)
for t ∈ [0, T ], where W = ρB +
√
1− ρ2B0, for two independent Brownian motions B ⊥ B0.
In general, one would expect the above problem to be continuous in time, due to the ‘av-
eraging’ effect of passing to the mean field limit, and, as long as this is the case, the system is
fully specified by (5.13). However, as we saw already in Section 4, the loss processes t 7→ Ll(t)
may in fact undergo jump discontinuities (in particular, [Hambly et al., 2019, Thm 1.1] can be
adapted to show that such jumps must occur for some parameters). When accounting for this,
one needs to be careful that the jump sizes are not pinned down uniquely by the formulation
(5.13). Similarly to the cascade condition for the finite system, a concrete choice must be made
that allows the system to be càdlàg and uniquely determines the jumps. This is the topic of the
next subsection.
5.3.1 Determining the jump sizes
Our first task is to show that the jump sizes must obey certain fixed point constraints. By
analogy with the analysis of cascades in the finite system, we therefore define the mapping
L : S(v)→ L∞(0, T ) by
Lv(t) :=
k∑
l=1
vlLl(t),
where L∞(0, T ) = L∞([0, T ],R) is the space of bounded real-valued functions on [0, T ] under the
equivalence relation of being equal almost everywhere. By Assumption 5.4 and the definition
of each Ll, the process t 7→ Lv(t) is indeed bounded, for each v ∈ S(v), and crucially the
assumptions also imply that t 7→ Lv(t) is increasing. Similarly to the constraint (5.9) for the
finite system, we can infer directly from (5.13) that the jumps of each Ll must satisfy
∆Ll(t) =
∫
R+×Rk×Rk
ulP
(
Xxu,v(t9) ∈ [0,Θ(t; ∆L, v)], t ≤ τ | B0
)
d$(x, u, v), (5.14)
where
Θ(t; f, v) := F
(∫ t9
0
g(s)dLv(s) + g(t)f(v)
)
− F
(∫ t9
0
g(s)dLv(s)
)
.
Once the jumps of L are pinned down, the constraint (5.14) uniquely determines the jumps
of each loss process Ll. Furthermore, from (5.14) and the definition of L, it follows that the
(random) value of ∆L must be a fixed point of the (random) mapping f 7→ Ξ(t; f, ·), where
Ξ(t; f, v) :=
k∑
l=1
vl
∫
R+×Rk×Rk
uˆlP
(
Xxuˆ,vˆ(t9) ∈ [0,Θ(t; f, vˆ)], t ≤ τ | B0
)
d$(x, uˆ, vˆ). (5.15)
In general, the map (5.15) can have several, even infinitely many, fixed points (for example,
f ≡ 0 is always a fixed point, but this is not compatible with jumps), so ∆L is not uniquely
specified a priori. This situation is resolved by the selection rule (5.16) introduced below,
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mimicking the cascade condition (5.12) for the jumps in the finite system. However, unlike the
finite system, the mean field limit always satisfies Ξ(t; 0, ·) = 0, so the occurrence and size of a
potential default cascade must be identified by artificially exposing the system to an arbitrarily
small shock. Specifically, we shift the system down by a small amount Θ(t; , v) and then keep
track of how the resulting losses propagate as ε ↓ 0, meaning that the size of the initial shift
Θ(t; , v) vanishes. Mathematically, this means that, for v ∈ S(v), the jump size ∆Lv(t) is given
by the mean field cascade condition
∆Lv(t) = limε↓0 limm↑∞∆
(m,ε)
t,v ,
∆
(m,ε)
t,v = Ξ(t, ε+ ∆
(m−1,ε)
t,· , v), m ≥ 1,
∆
(0,ε)
t,v = Ξ(t, ε, v),
(5.16)
where the equalities hold almost surely (recall that Ξ is conditional on the common noise B0).
We stress that the limit is well-defined, since (∆(m,ε)t,v ) forms a bounded sequence that increases
as m ↑ ∞ and decreases as ε ↓ 0. Moreover, dominated convergence shows that the (random)
map v 7→ ∆Lv(t) given by (5.16) is a fixed point of f 7→ Ξ(t, f, ·), so this choice for the jump
sizes is indeed consistent with the McKean–Vlasov problem (5.13).
Remark 5.7. We emphasise that the iterative structure of (5.16) lends itself easily to numerical
implementation, and this is indeed the starting point for the algorithm behind the simulations
in Figure 3. Moreover, we note that, in the case of a symmetric network of obligations, [Hambly
et al., 2019, Proposition 2.4] gives that the mean field cascade condition (5.16) agrees with the
corresponding notion of a ‘physical’ jump condition considered in Hambly et al. [2019].
5.3.2 A simple criterion for ruling out jumps
We now present a simple criterion, namely (5.18), that rules out a jump discontinuity at a
given time t > 0 and guarantees the solution stays continuous in some small amount of time
thereafter. Of course, the mean field cascade condition (5.16) already gives the precise criterion
for whether or not the system undergoes a jump at time t, but our aim here is to provide some
intuition for the workings of this condition.
At any given time t > 0, and for any pair (u, v), we let Vt(·|u, v) denote the random density
of the random sub-probability measure
A 7→ νt(A|u, v) :=
∫
R+
P
(
Xxu,v(t) ∈ A, t < τxu,v |B0
)
V0(x|u, v)dx. (5.17)
For the purposes of this subsection, we think of having fixed a realisation of B0, so the below
criteria (5.18) should be understood as holding for this particular realisation: thus, the conclu-
sion is that there is no jump for this particular realisation of B0. Of course, if the criteria holds
for all realisations of B0, then it is an almost sure conclusion.
Recalling the definition of Θ, we have Θ(t; f, v) ≤ ‖F‖Lipg(t)f(v), so
Ξ(t; f, v) ≤
k∑
l=1
vl
∫
Rk×Rk
∫ ‖F‖Lipg(t)f(vˆ)
0
uˆlVt9(y|uˆ, vˆ)dyd$ˆ(uˆ, vˆ),
where Vt9 is the pointwise left limit of Vs as s ↑ t. Now fix a time t > 0, and suppose Vt9 and
the joint distribution $ˆ of (u,v) satisfy the following criterion: there is a small δ > 0 such that,
for each v ∈ S(v),
‖F‖Lipg(t)
k∑
l=1
vl
∫
Rk×Rk
uˆlVt9(y|uˆ, vˆ)d$ˆ(uˆ, vˆ) ≤ 1− δ for all y ∈ (0, v), (5.18)
for some small enough v > 0. Then we get
∆
(0,ε)
t,v = Ξ(t, ε, v) ≤ (1− δ)ε,
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for all ε > 0 sufficiently small such that ‖F‖Lipg(t)ε < v. In turn, for all ε > 0 such that
‖F‖Lipg(t)(1 + (1− δ))ε < v, we have
∆
(1,ε)
t,v = Ξ(t, ε+ ∆
(0,ε)
t,· , v) ≤ (1− δ)ε+ (1− δ)2ε,
and, by recursion, for any given m ≥ 1 we thus have
∆
(m,ε)
t,v = Ξ(t, ε+ ∆
(m−1,ε)
t,· , v) ≤ ε
m∑
l=0
(1− δ)l+1,
for all ε > 0 such that ‖F‖Lipg(t)(
∑m
l=0(1 − δ)l)ε < v. Since 1 − δ < 1, the sum forms a
geometric series that converges as m → ∞, so provided (5.18) is satisfied we conclude that
∆Lv(t) = 0 for all v ∈ S(v), since
∆Lv(t) ≤ lim
ε↓0
lim
m↑∞
ε
m∑
l=0
(1− δ)l+1 = lim
ε↓0
ε
1− δ
δ
= 0.
In particular, each s 7→ Ll(s) must indeed continuous at time t. In other words, after the system
takes an artificial hit of order ε, the induced rounds of contagion quickly become negligible with
the total effect being at most of order ε (i.e., of the same order as the initial ‘artificial’ shock),
and so they disappear as the size of the initial shock is sent to zero. Furthermore, now that we
know there is not a jump, a straightforward adaptation of [Søjmark, 2019, Prop. 6.4.3] shows
that a bound of the form (5.18) holds for some small amount time, so the solution remains
continuous on this nonzero time interval.
On the other hand, Remark 4.2 from Section 4 provides a simple example where the condition
(5.18) is violated, for some v ∈ S(v), and where it is proved that the cascade condition must
therefore result in a jump discontinuity. In addition to the argument provided there, we remind
the reader of Figure 3, which illustrates the occurrence of the jump. In this respect, let us also
stress that there can of course be cases where t 7→ Lv(t) only jumps for some v ∈ S(v) and
not for others, provided there are certain types which are not exposed to the types experiencing
default cascades. As a particular example of this, we could amend the example behind Figure 3
by imposing that ‘Core 2’ is not exposed to losses in ‘Core 1’ and ‘Periphery 2’: then we obtain
an example where Ll jumps for l = 1, 4 (‘Core 1’ and ‘Periphery 2’) while it does not jump for
l = 2, 3 (‘Core 2’ and ‘Periphery 1’).
Remark 5.8. Notice that if the Dirichlet boundary condition Vt−(0|u, v) = 0 is satisfied (mean-
ing that limx↓0 Vt−(x|u, v) = 0), then (5.18) is definitely true. More generally, the criterion
amounts to y 7→ Vt9(y|u, v) being sufficiently small relative to ‖F‖−1Lipg(t)−1 near y = 0, depend-
ing on the joint distribution $ˆ. Starting from a nice initial condition, we will have Vt(0|u, v) = 0
for some amount of time, but if the contagious feedback becomes too strong it may transport
the density so fast towards the origin that there is a blow-up time t?: that is, the derivative of
t 7→ L(t) diverges as t ↑ t?, and the left limit density Vt?9 fails to vanish at zero, in a way such
that the cascade condition enforces a jump discontinuity ∆L(t?) > 0.
5.3.3 Idiosyncratic noise: well-posedness and regularity of the loss
In this subsection we consider the McKean–Vlasov problem (5.13) when ρ = 0, meaning that
there is no common noise. This makes it more tractable to get a handle on the regularity of
the loss processes. Under a mild assumption on the initial profile of the system, we are able to
generalise the arguments from Hambly et al. [2019] and thus show that the system is well-posed
up until the L2 norm of the gradient of the losses, namely (∂tL1, . . . , ∂tLk), explodes.
The assumption on the initial profile amounts to controlling the decay of the mass near the
origin. Specifically, using the notation from Assumption 5.4, we require that the initial condition
ν0 satisfies dν0(x|u, v) = V0(x|u, v)dx with
V0(x|u, v) ≤ C?xβ1x<x? +D?1x≥x? , for all x > 0, (5.19)
for constants C?, D?, x? > 0 and a power β ∈ (0, 1], uniformly in u ∈ S(u) and v ∈ S(v).
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Theorem 5.9 (Well-posedness up to explosion). Suppose the initial condition ν0 satisfies
(5.19) and let Assumption 5.3 be in place. Then there is a regular (i.e., differentiable) solu-
tion (L1 . . . ,Lk) to the McKean–Vlasov problem (5.13) up to the explosion time
t? := sup
{
t > 0 :
k∑
l=1
‖∂tLl(·)‖L2(0,t) <∞
}
∈ (0,∞],
with the property that, for all t < t?, ∂sLl(s) ≤ Ks−(1−β)/2 on [0, t] for some constant K > 0.
Moreover, the solution is unique on [0, t?] in the broadest possible sense: any generic càdlàg
solution to (5.13) satisfying the cascade condition (5.16) must agree with the regular solution on
[0, t?].
Proof. See Section A.1 in the Appendix.
We do not attempt to address general results on global uniqueness here, but it is natural
to conjecture that there is indeed uniqueness under the cascade condition (5.16). One would
then expect to have a regularity result analogous to Theorem 5.9 holding on the intervals in
between blow-ups. In the case of a symmetric network of liabilities and constant coefficients
with F (x) = x and g(x) = 1, it follows from [Hambly et al., 2019, Prop. 2.4] that the McKean–
Vlasov problem considered here (with only idiosyncratic noise) simplifies to that of [Hambly
et al., 2019, Eqn. (1.1)] with the physical jump condition [Hambly et al., 2019, Eqn. (1.8)] in
place of the cascade condition. For this problem, global uniqueness and regularity was recently
established in the preprint Delarue et al. [2019].
5.3.4 Common noise: global well-posedness with weak feedback
For a given initial profile ν0 and feedback functions F and g, we already argued above that
solutions to the conditional McKean–Vlasov problem (5.13) exist, by virtue of arising as limit
points of the finite particle system (5.5), provided Assumptions 5.4 and 5.3 are satisfied. For
the details of this, we refer to Section A.3 in the appendix.
Existence aside, general results on global as well as local uniqueness remain a challenge in the
presence of the common noise, even for simpler versions of the problem. Nevertheless, we have
the following result when a ‘smallness condition’, namely (5.20), is imposed on the feedback
functions F and g in relation to the initial profile of the system. This condition guarantees
that the feedback from contagion is too weak to generate blow-ups in the mean field limit,
independently of the different realisations of the common noise.
Theorem 5.10 (Global well-posedness in the weak feedback regime). Let Assumption 5.3 be
in place. If there is a δ > 0 such that
‖F‖Lipg(0)
k∑
l=1
vl
∫
Rk×Rk
uˆl‖V0(·|uˆ, vˆ)‖∞d$ˆ(uˆ, vˆ) ≤ 1− δ, (5.20)
for all v ∈ S(v), then there is a globally unique solution to (5.13), and this solution is continuous
in time.
Proof. See Section A.2 of the Appendix.
The smallness condition (5.20) should look familiar in light of Section 5.3.2, and indeed
the proof of continuity in time amounts to verifying that the smallness condition implies the
bound (5.18). On the other hand, by adapting the arguments from [Ledger and Søjmark, 2018a,
Theorem 2.7], one can show that: if the smallness condition (5.20) does not hold, then there is
a non-trivial probability of seeing jump discontinuities (for certain realisations of the common
noise). We make no attempt at treating uniqueness in that regime here.
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5.3.5 The core-periphery model from Section 4
In this final section we show how the core-periphery mean field model (4.10) from Section 4 is
a special case of the mean field limit (5.13). Following the framework of Section 5.3.5, given
m0 = mc +mp, we write n = mm0 for arbitrary multiples m ≥ 1, and let the liabilities matrix
λn×n be defined by (4.4)–(4.5) via the underlying matrix λˆm0×m0 . Due to the special structure,
we have the decomposition
m0λm0×m0 = Um0×kVk×m0 ,
with entries
uij = (1 + i)uˆij and vij = (1 + δj)vˆij
given the entries uˆij and vˆij of the underlying rank decomposition
m0λˆm0×m0 = Uˆm0×kVˆk×m0 .
Now consider the concrete choice (4.3) for λˆm0×m0 , and notice that the four types (two core
banks and two peripheral groups) means that its decomposition is fully described by just four
row vectors of Uˆm0×k and four column vectors of Vˆk×m0 : namely the two ‘core’ pairs
(u˜1, v˜1) := (uˆ1, vˆ1) and (u˜2, v˜2) := (uˆ2, vˆ2) (5.21)
as well as the two ‘peripheral’ pairs
(u˜3, v˜3) := (uˆ3, vˆ3) = · · · = (uˆ2+mp,1 , vˆ2+mp,1)
(u˜4, v˜4) := (uˆ3+mp,1 , vˆ3+mp,1) = · · · = (uˆm0 , vˆm0). (5.22)
As we grow the system to arbitrarily large sizes n = mm0, according to (4.4), this underlying
structure from the rank decomposition of λˆ is preserved. Thus, the empirical measures (5.4)
corresponding to the decompositions
nλn×n = mm0λmm0×mm0 = Umm0×kVk×mm0
take the form
$n =
1
m0
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
δ(1+1i )uˆ1 ⊗ δ(1+δ1i )vˆ1 ⊗ δX1i (0) +
1
m
m∑
i=1
δ(1+2i )uˆ2 ⊗ δ(1+δ2i )vˆ2 ⊗ δX2i (0)
+
mp,1∑
j=1
1
m
m∑
i=1
δ(1+3ij)u˜3 ⊗ δ(1+δ4ij)v˜3 ⊗ δX3i (0) +
mp,2∑
j=1
1
m
m∑
i=1
δ(1+4ij)u˜4 ⊗ δ(1+δ4ij)v˜4 ⊗ δX4i (0)
)
for a general n = mm0, for all m ≥ 1. Since all the (, δ)’s are drawn from P ⊗P in an i.i.d. way,
it follows that $n is weakly convergent with limiting law
$ =
1
m0
Law(u1,v1, X1(0)) +
1
m0
Law(u2,v2, X2(0))
+
mp,1
m0
Law(u3,v3, X3(0)) +
mp,2
m0
Law(u4,v4, X4(0)) (5.23)
where
Law(ui,vi) = (P ⊗ P ) ◦ φ−1i , φi(θ) =
(
(1 + θ)u˜i, (1 + θ)v˜i
)
, (5.24)
for i = 1, . . . , 4, given the four (fixed and deterministic) principal pairs (u˜i, v˜i) ∈ Rk ×Rk from
(5.21)–(5.22). It remains to observe that, for each i, j = 1 . . . , 4, the mutual exposures
λ˜ij :=
1
m0
v˜j · u˜i = 1
m0
k∑
l=1
(v˜j)l(u˜i)l =
1
m0
k∑
l=1
u˜ilv˜lj (5.25)
are precisely those of λ˜4×4 in (4.11). Writing τxl,θ = τ
x
φl(θ)
and Xxl,θ = X
x
φl(θ)
, it therefore
follows from (5.23)–(5.24) and (5.25) that the general formulation of the mean field limit (5.13)
simplifies to that of (4.10) from Section 4, as desired.
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6 Conclusion
In this work we introduced the first combined model that considers an Eisenberg–Noe style
framework for interbank contagion which can be recast as an interacting particle system with a
well-defined mean field limit. Therefore, we are able to draw a direct connection between these
previously disparate frameworks for systemic risk, focusing either on the resolution of default
cascades in finite bank networks or stochastic dynamics with simple mean field interactions.
The proposed contagion mechanism considers banks with stochastic external assets which, if
they drop, can cause defaults before the maturity of all claims. This is handled first for a finite
number of institutions in a purely Eisenberg–Noe style framework, thus extending Banerjee
et al. [2018] to account for early defaults. Next, we demonstrate a limiting behaviour as the
number of banks increase, which provides justification for performing the analysis of contagion
at the level of the mean field limit. In this way, one can significantly lower the parameter space,
and it becomes more tractable to pursue analytical results for the regularity of the system’s
evolution in time. Moreover, one can circumvent the curse of dimensionality and avoid the slow
convergence of Monte Carlo based methods, for example by implementing an analogue of the
numerical scheme from Ledger and Søjmark [2018a] as we did in Figure 3 (alternatively, one
could attempt to adapt the semi-analytical approach of Kaushansky et al. [2018c]). As regards
the antecedent mean field literature, we provide a more convincing financial underpinning for
Hambly et al. [2019], Hambly and Søjmark [2019], Ledger and Søjmark [2018a], Nadtochiy
and Shkolnikov [2019a,b], while also extending the analytical results of Hambly et al. [2019],
Ledger and Søjmark [2018a,b] to allow for heterogeneous interactions and a more general form
of contagion. Furthermore, we add to Nadtochiy and Shkolnikov [2019b] by introducing the
cascade condition for the resolution of instantaneous default cascades (i.e., jump sizes) as well
as establishing results on convergence and uniqueness.
The model of default cascades presented herein can be utilized to answer many questions in
systemic risk that are typically intractable analytically (as well as computationally inefficient)
for finite bank networks. Additionally, the mean field limit allows for a cleaner analysis of key
‘systemic’ quantities, as exemplified by the mean field cascade condition that gives a precise
characterisation of default cascades with an instantaneous ‘systemic’ impact. One important
new strand of literature is that of network valuation adjustments Barucca et al. [2016], Banerjee
and Feinstein [2019], in which prices of securities should account for the full network effects.
In this regard, the stochastic dynamics underlying the framework herein makes it well-suited
for, e.g., pricing credit default swaps on the financial system. By further utilizing the mean
field limit, the lower parameter space can facilitate calibration of the stochastic dynamics, and
this also opens up the possibility of relying on more analytical methods. These problems are
intimately related with systemic risk measures. For instance, the value-at-risk or CoVaR Adrian
and Brunnermeier [2016] of the financial system are related to mappings such as
a 7→ P(L(t) > a) and (a, δ) 7→ P(L(t+ δ)− L(t) > a),
for a given time t. More specifically, an interesting modification of CoVaR in the mean field
limit for core-periphery systems, as discussed in Section 4, is for consideration of the health
of the aggregate system conditional on the stress of one of the “groups” of institutions. In
fact, such structures may allow for the tractable consideration of general systemic risk measures
of Chen et al. [2013], Feinstein et al. [2017], Biagini et al. [2019b] as well. Additionally, rather
than applying these network valuation adjustments for measuring systemic risk in exogenously
provided network structures, the pricing of risk in such a way may allow for considerations of
endogenous network formation. In such a setting, each financial institution would choose to
invest in external projects or engage in interbank markets so as to solve some portfolio opti-
mization problem. Only with a consideration of credit pricing in a financial network would such
endogenous network formation be tractable, and we believe this points towards an important
avenue of future research.
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A Appendix
This appendix contains the proofs of the main results from Section 5 and is organised into three
subsections. The first two subsections address the proofs of Theorems 5.9 and 5.10, respectively,
while the final subsection is focused on the identification of the mean field problem (5.13) as the
large population limit of the finite particle system (5.1). Throughout the appendix, we will be
working under Assumptions 5.3 and 5.4.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 5.9
We introduce the notation ‖f‖t := ‖f‖L∞(0,t) and recall the notation S(v) = supp(Law(v))
from Assumption 5.4. Given this, we can consider the space of continuous maps v 7→ `v(·) from
S(v) to L∞(0, t), denoted by
C∗t := C
(
S(v);L∞(0, t)
)
,
with respect to the supremum norm
‖`‖∗t := sup
v∈S(v)
‖`v(·)‖t.
Since the domain S(v) is a compact subset of Rk, by Assumption 5.4, and the codomain L∞(0, t)
is a Banach space, this norm makes C∗t a Banach space. In order to construct a regular solution
to the McKean–Vlasov problem (5.13, ρ = 0), until an explosion time, we will work with the
map Γ, defined in (A.1) below. Our strategy is to identify a suitable closed subset of C∗t , for
small enough t > 0, on which we can apply Banach’s fixed point theorem.
A.1.1 Comparison argument and existence of regular solutions
Given T > 0, we define the map Γ : C∗T 7→ C∗T by
Γ[`]v(t) :=
k∑
l=1
vl
∫
R+×Rk×Rk
uˆlP(t ≥ τx,`uˆ,vˆ)d$(x, uˆ, vˆ), (A.1)
for all t ∈ [0, T ] and v ∈ S(v), whereτ
x,`
u,v = inf{t > 0 : Xx,`u,v(t) ≤ 0}
Xx,`u,v(t) = x+
∫ t
0
bu,v(s)ds+
∫ t
0
σu,v(s)dBs − F
(∫ t
0
g(s)d`v(s)
)
.
(A.2)
Note that, as long as s 7→ `v(s) is continuous or of finite variation, the integral of g against `v in
(A.2) is well-defined, since g is both continuous and of finite variation by Assumption 5.3 (see
e.g. [Stroock, 2011, Sect. 1.2]). Naturally, all of the results that follow are stated for inputs such
that the mapping makes sense.
The cornerstone of our analysis is the next comparison argument. It leads us to the fixed
point argument for existence of regular solutions, and it reappears in the generic uniqueness
argument of Section A.1.2 which completes the full statement of Theorem 5.9.
Lemma A.1 (Comparison argument). Fix any two `, ¯`∈ C∗T such that s 7→ `v(s) and s 7→ ¯`v(s)
are increasing with `v(0) = ¯`v(0) = 0 for all v ∈ S(v). Fix also t0 > 0 and suppose s 7→ `v(s) is
continuous on [0, t0) for all v ∈ S(v). Then we have
(
Γ[`]v(t)− Γ[¯`]v(t)
)+ ≤ C‖(`− ¯`)+‖∗t ∫ t
0
(t− s)− 12 dΓ[`]v(s),
for all t < t0 and all v ∈ S(v), where C > 0 is a fixed numerical constant (i.e., it is independent
of t0 and v).
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Proof. Fix t < t0. Recalling that `v(0) = 0, integration by parts (see e.g., [Stroock, 2011,
Sect. 1.2]) gives ∫ t
0
g(s)d`v(s) = g(t)`v(t) +
∫ t
0
`v(s)d(−g)(s),
and likewise for ¯`v. Using this and the assumptions on F , g, `, and ¯`, we have
F
(∫ t
0
g(s)d`v(s)
)
− F
(∫ t
0
g(s)d¯`v(s)
)
≤ ‖F‖Lip
(∫ t
0
g(s)d`v(s)−
∫ t
0
g(s)d¯`v(s)
)+
= ‖F‖Lip
(
g(t)(`v(t)− ¯`v(t)) +
∫ t
0
(`(s)− ¯`(s))d(−g)(s)
)+
≤ g(t)‖F‖Lip
(
`v(t)− ¯`v(t)
)+
+ ‖F‖Lip
∫ t
0
(
`v(s)− ¯`v(s)
)+
d(−g)(s)
≤ g(0)‖F‖Lip‖(`v − ¯`v)+‖t.
Thus, taking the difference between the two processes Xx,`u,v and Xx,
¯`
u,v, as defined in (A.2) coupled
through the same Brownian motion, it follows that
Xx,
¯`
u,v(t)−Xx,`u,v(t) ≤ g(0)‖F‖Lip‖(`v − ¯`v)+‖t.
Therefore, using the continuity of `v, for any s ∈ [0, t], it holds on the event {τx,`u,v = s} that
Xx,
¯`
u,v(s) = X
x,¯`
u,v(s)−Xx,`u,v(s) ≤ g(0)‖F‖Lip‖(`− ¯`)+‖∗s.
Based on this, we can replicate the arguments from [Hambly et al., 2019, Prop. 3.1], by instead
conditioning on the value of τx,`u,v and using the previous inequality, to deduce that
P(t ≥ τx,`u,v)− P(t ≥ τx,¯`u,v)
≤
∫ t
0
P
(
inf
r∈[s,t]
∫ r
s
σu,v(h)dBh > −g(0)‖F‖Lip‖(`− ¯`)+‖∗s
)
dP(s ≥ τx,`u,v).
Performing a time change in the Brownian integral, and using that there is a uniform  > 0 such
that  ≤ σu,v ≤ −1, by Assumption 5.3, it follows from the law of the infimum of a Brownian
motion that
P(t ≥ τx,`u,v)− P(t ≥ τx,¯`u,v) ≤ C‖(`− ¯`)+‖∗t
∫ t
0
(t− s)− 12 dP(s ≥ τx,`u,v)
where the constant C > 0 is independent of t, x, u, and v. Now fix any v˜ ∈ S(v). Multiplying
both sides of the above inequality by
∑k
l=1 v˜lul and recalling that this is non-negative for all
u in the support of $, by Assumption 5.4, we can then integrate both sides of the resulting
inequality against $, over (x, u, v) ∈ R+ × Rk × Rk, to arrive at
Γ[`]v˜(t)− Γ[¯`]v˜(t) ≤ C‖(`− ¯`)+‖∗t
∫ t
0
(t− s)− 12 dΓ[`]v˜(t),
for all t < t0, for some fixed numerical constant C > 0 independent of t0 and v˜. As the
right-hand side is positive, this proves the lemma.
For any γ ∈ (0, 1/2), A > 0, and t > 0, we define the space S(γ,A, t) ⊂ C∗t by
S(γ,A, t) := {` ∈ C(S(v);H1(0, t)) : `′v(t) ≤ At−γ for a.e. t ∈ [0, t], v ∈ S(v)}, (A.3)
which is a complete metric space with the metric inherited from C∗t . Moreover, we define the
map
Γˆ[`;u, v](t) :=
∫ ∞
0
P(t ≥ τx,`u,v)dν0(x|u, v),
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so that Γ[`]v˜(t) =
∑k
l=1 v˜l
∫
Rk×Rk ulΓˆ[`;u, v](t)d$ˆ(u, v). Then, for each u and v, we can replicate
the arguments from [Hambly et al., 2019, Sect. 4] for the function t 7→ Γˆ[`;u, v](t) in place of the
corresponding function considered there. Given $ˆ and V0(·|u, v) satisfying (5.19), we can thus
conclude (by arguing precisely as in [Hambly et al., 2019, Prop. 4.9]), that there exists A > 0
such that, for any ε0 > 0, there is a small enough time t0 > 0 for which
Γ : S( 1−β2 , A+ ε0, t0)→ S( 1−β2 , A+ ε0, t0), (A.4)
where A only depends on C? and x? from (5.19). Moreover, by analogy with [Hambly et al.,
2019, Thm. 1.6], we can deduce from Lemma A.1 that Γ is a contraction on this space for small
enough t0. Therefore, the small time existence of a regular solution L∗v(t) =
∑k
l=1 vlLl(t) to
(5.13, ρ = 0) now follows from an application of Banach’s fixed point theorem as in the proof of
[Hambly et al., 2019, Thm. 1.7]. Finally, by replicating the bootstrapping argument from the
proof of [Hambly et al., 2019, Cor. 5.3], we conclude that the regular solution extends until the
first time t? such that the H1 norm of (L1, . . . ,Lk) diverges on (0, t?). This proves the first part
of Theorem 5.9.
A.1.2 Generic uniqueness
It remains to verify that the general uniqueness result of [Hambly et al., 2019, Thm. 1.8] can be
extended to the present setting, which will follow from the two lemmas below. The first lemma
concerns a family of auxiliary McKean–Vlasov problems given by
Xx,u,v(t) = x1x≥ε − ε4 +
∫ t
0
bu,v(s)ds+
∫ t
0
σu,v(s)dBs − F
(
g(0)λεv +
∫ t
0
g(s)dLεv(s)
)
Lεv(t) =
∑k
l=1 vl
∫
R+×Rk×Rk uˆlP(τ
x,ε
uˆ,vˆ ≤ t)d$(x, uˆ, vˆ)
τx,εu,v = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xx,εu,v(t) ≤ 0},
(A.5)
for ε > 0, where λεv :=
∑k
l=1 vl
∫
(0,ε)×Rk×Rk uˆld$(x, uˆ, vˆ). This family of equations will serve
as the equivalent of the ‘ε-deleted solutions’ introduced in [Hambly et al., 2019, Sect. 5.2]. By
writing
Lεv(t) = λ
ε
v + L˜
ε
v(t) with L˜
ε
v(t) =
k∑
l=1
vl
∫
[ε,∞)×Rk×Rk
uˆlP(τx,εuˆ,vˆ ≤ t)d$(x, uˆ, vˆ), (A.6)
we can show that these ε-deleted problems are well-posed with regularity estimates that are
uniform in ε > 0.
Lemma A.2 (Uniformly regular ε-deleted solutions). There is an ε0 > 0 such that (A.5) has
a family of solutions {Lε}ε≤ε0 which are uniformly regular in the following sense: There exists
A > 0 and t0 > 0 such that Lε ∈ S( 1−β2 , A, t0) uniformly in ε ∈ (0, ε0].
Proof. First of all, we can note that λεv ≤ C?ε1+β/(1+β) uniformly in v, for small enough ε > 0,
by (5.19), and clearly F (x) = o(x1/(1+β)) as x ↓ 0, since F is Lipschitz with F (0) = 0. Hence
there exists ε0 > 0 such that F (g(0)λεv) ≤ ε/4 for all ε ∈ (0, ε0). Next, using (A.6) and making
the change of variables y = x− ε/4− F (g(0)λεv) in (A.5) we obtain the equivalent formulation
X˜y,εu,v(t) = y +
∫ t
0
bu,v(s)ds+
∫ t
0
σu,v(s)dB(s)− F
(
g(0)λεv +
∫ t
0
g(s)dL˜εv(s)
)
+ F
(
g(0)λεv
)
L˜εv(t) =
∑k
l=1 vl
∫
R+×Rk×Rk uˆlP(τ˜
y,ε
uˆ,vˆ ≤ t)V ε0 (y|uˆ, vˆ)dyd$ˆ(uˆ, vˆ)
V ε0 (y|u, v) = V0
(
y + ε4 + F (g(0)λ
ε
v)
)
1{y+ ε4 +F (g(0)λεv)≥ε}
τ˜y,εu,v = inf{t ≥ 0 : X˜y,εu,v(t) ≤ 0}
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Now take ε0 ≤ x?. Recalling that F (λεv) ≤ ε/4 for all ε ∈ (0, ε0), we can then observe that
V ε0 (y|u, v) ≤ C?
(
y + ε/4 + F (g(0)λεv)
)
1y+ε/4+F (g(0)λεv)≥ε
≤ (y + ε/2)β1y≥ε/2 ≤ 2βC?yβ for all y < x?/2,
uniformly in u, v, and ε ∈ (0, ε0). Therefore, for each ε ∈ (0, ε0), we can indeed construct a
regular solution L˜ε to the above system by the first part of Theorem 5.9 (as proved in Section
A.1.1). Moreover, since the boundary control on V ε0 (·|u, v) is uniform in ε ∈ (0, ε0), uniformly
in u and v, it follows from the fixed point argument in Section A.1.1 that the regularity of the
solutions L˜ε is also uniform in ε ∈ (0, ε0). By (A.6), the uniform regularity of the original family
Lε follows a fortiori from that of L˜ε, and thus the proof is complete.
Armed with Lemma A.2, we can now proceed to the final ingredient of the general uniqueness
result, namely the ‘monotonicity and trapping’ argument from [Hambly et al., 2019, Sect. 5.2].
Lemma A.3 (Monotonicity and vanishing envelope). Let L∗ : S(v)→ L∞(0, T ) be given by
L∗v(t) :=
k∑
l=1
vlLl =
k∑
l=1
vl
∫
R+×Rk×Rk
uˆlP(t ≥ τxuˆ,vˆ)d$(x, uˆ, vˆ)
for a generic solution to (5.13) with ρ = 0, and suppose there are no jumps of (L1, . . . ,Lk) on
[0, t0) so s 7→ L∗v(s) is continuous on [0, t0) for all v. If Lε is a continuous ‘ε-deleted’ solution on
[0, t0), then Lεv > Lv on [0, t0), for all v 6= 0. Moreover, if L is regular on [0, t0) and the family
{Lε} is uniformly regular on [0, t0), in the sense of Lemma A.2, then there is a t1 ∈ (0, t0) such
that the envelope between the two is vanishing on [0, t1], that is, ‖L− Lε‖∗t1 → 0 as ε→ 0.
Proof. Noting that Lεv(0) = λv > 0 = Lv(0) for v 6= 0, towards a contradiction we let t ∈ (0, t0)
be the first time Lεv(t) = Lv(t) for some v 6= 0. Then it holds for any s < t that
g(0)λεv +
∫ s
0
g(r)dLεv(r) =
∫ s
0
Lεv(r)d(−g)(r) + g(s)Lεv(s)
≥
∫ s
0
Lv(r)d(−g)(r) + g(s)Lv(s) =
∫ s
0
g(r)dLv(r).
and, since F is increasing, we thus have
Xxu,v(s)−Xx,εu,v(s) = x1x<ε +
ε
4
+ F
(
g(0)λεv +
∫ s
0
gdLεv
)
− F
(∫ s
0
gdLv
)
≥ ε
4
, (A.7)
for all s ∈ (0, t). Arguing as in the proof of [Hambly et al., 2019, Lemma 5.6], it follows from
(A.7) that
Lεv(t) ≥ Lv(t) +
k∑
l=1
vl
∫
R+×Rk×Rk
uˆlP
(
inf
r∈[0,t]
Xxu,v(s) ∈ (0, ε/4]
)
d$(x, uˆ, vˆ) > Lv(t),
which contradicts the definition of t, thus proving the first claim.
For the second claim, can now rely on the fact that Lεv > Lv on [0, t0) for all v 6= 0.
Consequently, since Xx,εu,v(s) = 0 on the event {τx,εu,v = s}, we deduce that, on this event,
Xxu,v(s) = X
x
u,v(s)−Xx,εu,v(s) ≤ ε+
ε
4
+ g(0)‖F‖Lip‖Lεv − Lv‖s, (A.8)
where the inequality follows by the equality in (A.7) and the same estimate as in the proof of
Lemma A.1. From here, (A.8) allows us to replicate the proof of [Hambly et al., 2019, Lemma
5.7], only with the term ‘g(0)‖F‖Lip‖Lε − L‖∗s’ in place of the term ‘α(Lεs − Ls)’ appearing in
that proof. This verifies the second claim.
Based on Lemmas A.1 and A.3, the uniqueness part of Theorem 5.9 now follows immediately
by retracing the proof of [Hambly et al., 2019, Thm. 1.8] (at the very end of [Hambly et al.,
2019, Sect. 5]) with the cascade condition (5.16) taking the place of the physical jump condition
[Hambly et al., 2019, (1.7)].
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A.2 Proof of Theorem 5.10
Let us begin by proving the continuity of a given solution satisfying the smallness condition
(5.20). To this end, we fix a pair (u, v) and write Xxu,v(t) = x + Y (t) + Y0(t) with Y (t) :=∫ t
0
ρσu,v(s)dBs so Y0(t) is B0-measurable. Letting p(t, ·) denote the density of Y (t), it follows
from Tonelli’s theorem that∫
R+
P
(
Xxu,v(t) ∈ A, t < τxu,v | B0
)
V0(x|u, v)dx ≤
∫
R
∫
A
p(t, y + x+ Y0(t))V0(x|u, v)dydx
=
∫
A
∫
R
p(t, x+ y + Y0(t))V0(x|u, v)dxdy ≤ ‖V0(·|u, v)‖∞|A|,
for all A ∈ B(R), since p(t, ·) integrates to 1. Recalling the definition of Vt from (5.17), this shows
that Vt(x|u, v) ≤ ‖V0(·|u, v)‖∞ for all x ∈ (0,∞) and all times t ≥ 0. Therefore, the criterion
(5.18) holds for all times, by the smallness condition (5.20), and hence the given solution must
be globally continuous in time.
To prove the uniqueness part of Theorem 5.10, we show how to extend the arguments behind
[Ledger and Søjmark, 2018b, Thm. 2.3]. Let (X,L) and (X¯, L¯) be any two solutions to (5.13)
coupled through the same Brownian drivers B and B0. Then we define the increasing processes
Lv :=
k∑
l=1
vlLl and L¯v :=
k∑
l=1
vlL¯l
for every v ∈ S(v). Retracing the arguments of [Ledger and Søjmark, 2018b, Lemma 2.1], and
applying Fubini’s theorem, we can deduce that
Lv(s)− L¯v(s) ≤ E
[ k∑
l
vl
∫
Rk×Rk
uˆl
∫ Ivˆ(s)
I¯vˆ(s)
V0(x|uˆ, vˆ)dxd$ˆ(uˆ, vˆ)
∣∣∣B0],
where
Iv(t) := sup
s≤t
{
F
(∫ s
0
g(r)dLv(r)
)
− Zs
}
, and I¯v(t) := sup
s≤t
{
F
(∫ s
0
g(r)dL¯v(r)
)
− Zs
}
,
with
Zs :=
∫ s
0
b(r)dr +
∫ s
0
σ(r)d(ρB0 +
√
1− ρ2B)(r).
By symmetry, L¯v(s) − Lv(s) satisfies the analogous bound with Iv(s) and I¯v(s) interchanged.
Furthermore, by simply repeating the first estimate from the proof of Lemma A.1, only with L
and L¯ in place of ` and ¯`, we have
F
(∫ t
0
g(s)dLv(s)
)
≥ F
(∫ t
0
g(s)d L¯v(s)
)
− g(0)‖F‖Lip‖L− L¯‖∗t .
Therefore, relying on this inequality together with the previous observation, we can retrace the
arguments of [Ledger and Søjmark, 2018b, Theorem 2.2] and conclude that
|Lv(s)− L¯v(s)| ≤ g(0)‖F‖Lip‖L− L¯‖∗s
k∑
l=1
vl
∫
Rk×Rk
uˆl‖V0(·|uˆ, vˆ)‖∞d$ˆ(uˆ, vˆ).
At this point, the smallness condition (5.20) gives
|Lv(s)− L¯v(s)| ≤ (1− δ)‖L− L¯‖∗s,
so, taking a supremum over v ∈ S(v) on the left-hand side, we conclude that there is pathwise
uniqueness.
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A.3 Convergence of the particle system
In this section we outline how the convergence to the conditional McKean–Vlasov problem
(5.13) can be established by retracing the approach of Ledger and Søjmark [2018a] after some
adjustments. The arguments rely heavily on specific properties of the M1-topology for the
Skorokhod space of càdlàg paths. The reader is referred to Whitt [2002] for an introduction to
this topology. For concreteness, let us restrict to random start points Xi0 satisfying (5.19) near
the absorbing boundary at zero, although it is possible to consider higher generality in these
arguments.
Let DR denote the space of real-valued càdlàg paths on [0, T ], and let (X1, . . . , Xn) be the
unique strong solution to the particle system (5.5) of size n in DR×· · ·×DR (recall Proposition
5.5). Moreover, as usual, we let ui ∈ Rk and vi ∈ Rk denote the type vectors from (5.4), for
i = 1, . . . , n. For simplicity of notation, we are suppressing the dependence on n ≥ 1 in each
triple (ui,vi, Xi) ∈ Rk × Rk ×DR. Now consider the empirical measures
Pn :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
δui ⊗ δvi ⊗ δXi(·), for n ≥ 1, (A.9)
which are random variables valued in the space of probability measures P(Rk ×Rk ×DR). For
(u, v, η) ∈ Rk×Rk×DR, we define the coordinate projections pi1,l(u, v, η) := ul, pi2,l(u, v, η) := vl,
and pi3,t(u, v, η) := ηt as well as pit(u, v, η) := (u, v, ηt) and pi(1,2)(u, v, η) := (u, v). Writing
Pnt := P
n ◦ pi−1t and $ˆn := Pn ◦ pi−1(1,2), we have Pn0 = $n ⇒ $ and $ˆn → $ˆ by virtue of
Assumption 5.4. The first task is to ensure tightness of the pair (Pn, B0) so that we can extract
weakly convergent subsequences.
Lemma A.4 (Tightness). The sequence of random variables (Pn, B0) is tight on the product
space P(Rk × Rk × DR) × CR. Here CR is the space of continuous real-valued paths on [0, T ]
topologized by uniform convergence, and P(Rk×Rk×DR) is topologized by weak convergence of
measures as induced by the M1-topology on DR.
Proof. SinceDR is a Polish space with the M1-topology, it is a classical result (see e.g. [Sznitman,
1991, Ch.I, Prop. 2.2]) that the sequence of (random) empirical measures Pn is tight if, for each
ε > 0, we can find Kε compact in Rk × Rk ×DR, where DR comes with the M1-topology, such
that, for all n ≥ 1,
En(Kε) ≥ 1− ε, where En(Kε) := 1
n
n∑
i=1
P
(
(ui,vi, Xi) ∈ Kε
)
.
To fulfil this, it is sufficient that, for every ε > 0, we can find a compact set Kε such that
P((ui,vi, Xi) ∈ Kε) ≥ 1 − ε for each i = 1, . . . , n uniformly in n ≥ 1. By Assumption 5.4, we
have |ui| + |vi| ≤ C, for some C > 0, uniformly in i = 1, . . . , n and n ≥ 1. Hence we can take
Kε to be of the form Kε = B¯C × Sε, where B¯C is the closed ball of radius C in R2k, and Sε
is compact in (DR,M1). Consequently, writing Xni for the i’th particle in the size-n particle
system, it suffices to show that each sequence (Xni )n≥1 is tight with estimates that are uniform
in i = 1, . . . , n and n ≥ 1. To this end, the first crucial observation is that
t 7→ F
( k∑
l=1
vil
∫ t
0
g(s)dLnl (s)
)
is increasing. Therefore, exploiting the special nature of the M1-topology, the uniform tightness
estimates can be established by retracing the steps of [Ledger and Søjmark, 2018a, Prop. 3.9].
We now turn to the problem of identifying the limit points of (Pn, B0) as n → ∞, where
convergent subsequences are ensured by Prokhorov’s theorem in light of the previous lemma.
First of all, we define the mapping
(Ll(µ))(t) :=
〈
µ, pi1,l(·)1(∞,0]
(
inf
s≤t
pi3,t(·)
)〉
, (A.10)
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for µ ∈ P(Rk × Rk ×DR), where the rationale is of course that
(Ll(Pn))(t) = 1
n
n∑
j=1
ujl1t≥τj = Lnl (t). (A.11)
Using the mappings µ 7→ Ll(µ), we in turn define
(M(u, v, η, µ))(t) := η(t)− η(0)−
∫ t
0
bu,v(s)ds− F
( k∑
l=1
vl
∫ t
0
g(s)d(Ll(µ))(s)
)
, (A.12)
and we then intend to perform a martingale argument to identify the limit points of (Pn, B0)
based on mappings of the form
(µ,w) 7→ 〈µ,Ψ(M(·, µ), w)〉 (A.13)
for (µ,w) ∈ P(Rk × Rk ×DR) × CR, for suitable functions Ψ : DR × CR → R. Indeed, we can
observe that
〈
Pn,Ψ
(M(·,Pn), B0)〉 = 1
n
n∑
i=1
Ψ
(∫ t
0
σui,vi(s)d
(
ρB0(s) +
√
1− ρ2Bi(s)
)
, B0
)
,
where the right-hand side is a nice average of the function Ψ applied to square integrable
martingales on [0, T ]. This will essentially allow us to transfer suitable martingale properties to
the limit as n→∞, which is the machinery behind the next observations.
Proceeding as in [Ledger and Søjmark, 2018a, Lemma 3.11] we can show that (A.13) and sim-
ilar mappings are continuous for suitable functions Ψ (the specific mappings are defined imme-
diately before [Ledger and Søjmark, 2018a, Lemma 3.11]). Fix a limit point (P, B0) of (Pn, B0),
realised along a convergent subsequence (due to Lemma A.4 above). Write$ = Law(u,v, X(0)),
where we recall that $ = P0 is the limit of $n = Pn0 , as ensured by Assumption (5.4). Re-
tracing the steps of [Ledger and Søjmark, 2018a, Prop. 3.12] and [Ledger and Søjmark, 2018a,
Proof of Thm. 3.2, p. 26], based on the aforementioned continuity results, we can show that
there is a probability space (Ω¯, F¯ , P¯) which supports our limiting random variables (u,v,P, B0)
and also carries a càdlàg process X as well as a Brownian motion B ⊥ B0, for which (B,B0) is
independent of (u,v, X(0)), such that
(M(u,v, X,P))(t) =
∫ t
0
σu,v(s)d
(
ρB0(s) +
√
1− ρ2B(s))
holds for all t ∈ [0, T ], P¯-almost surely. In other words, on the background space (Ω¯, F¯ , P¯), we
have
X(t) = X(0) +
∫ t
0
bu,v(s)ds+
∫ t
0
σu,v(s)d
(
ρB0(s) +
√
1− ρ2Bi(s)
)
− F
( k∑
l=1
vl
∫ t
0
g(s)d(Ll(P))(s)
)
. (A.14)
To avoid clouding the presentation, let us (for now) assume that the limiting random probability
measure P is known to be B0 measurable. Intuitively, this is what one expects, as the sequence
Pn is subject to the common noise B0, which is felt by all the particles, and hence should
stay in the limit; whereas the effect of the idiosyncratic noise from the independent Brownian
motions B1, . . . , Bn will be averaged way in the limit. The situation where P is not known
to be B0-measurable is dealt with separately in Remark A.5 below. Once we have that P is
B0-measurable, retracing the proof of [Ledger and Søjmark, 2018a, Thm. 3.2], as we did above,
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not only gives (A.14), but also shows that P = Law(u,v, X |B0). Therefore, letting E¯ denote
the expectation operator corresponding to P¯, we have
(Ll(P))(t) =
〈
P, pi1,l(·)1(∞,0]
(
inf
s≤t
pi3,t(·)
)〉
= E¯
[
ul1(−∞,0]
(
inf
s≤t
Xs
) |B0]
= E¯
[
ulP¯
[
inf
s≤t
Xs ≤ 0 | B0,u,v, X(0)
] ∣∣B0]. (A.15)
Since (u,v, X(0)) is independent of (B,B0), using the equation forX in (A.14) and the definition
of L in (A.10), we can conclude from (A.15) that
(Ll(P))(t) =
∫
R+×Rk×Rk
ulP(t ≥ τxu,v | B0)d$(x, u, v), l = 1, . . . , k, (A.16)
where $ = P0 is the limit of $n given by (5.6), and where we have defined
τxu,v := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxu,v(t) ≤ 0}, and
Xxu,v(t) := x+
∫ t
0
bu,v(s)ds+
∫ t
0
σu,v(s)d(ρB0(s) +
√
1− ρ2Bi(s)
)
− F
( k∑
l=1
vl
∫ t
0
g(s)d(Ll(P))(s)
)
, (A.17)
for all realisations (u, v) of (u,v). Consequently, we have recovered the desired mean field
limit (5.13), since the limit point (P, B0) of (Pn, B0) satisfies the conditional McKean–Vlasov
problem (A.16)–(A.17). Furthermore, as in [Ledger and Søjmark, 2018a, Prop. 3.6] and the proof
of [Ledger and Søjmark, 2018a, Prop. 3.9], the above tightness and continuity results, along with
the expression (A.11), give that (in the M1 topology on DR), the loss processes Lnl = Ll(Pn)
converge to the desired limiting loss processes Ll = Ll(P) satisfying the conditional McKean–
Vlasov problem (A.16)–(A.17).
Remark A.5. Without assuming B0-measurability, we need to work with what is defined as a
‘relaxed’ solution to (5.13) in [Ledger and Søjmark, 2018a, Sect. 3]. Specifically, the arguments
from Ledger and Søjmark [2018a] only gives that P = Law(u,v, X |B0,P) with (B0,P) ⊥ B
and (B, (B0,P)) ⊥ X(0), as opposed to P = Law(u,v, X |B0) which we relied on above. That
is, P fulfils the first criteria for being the conditional law of (u,v, X) given B0, but it is only
known to be (B0,P)-measurable, and hence it may not be the true conditional law given B0.
Yet, it behaves in almost the same way, since it is also independent of B, which is precisely
what we expected to happen in the limit, as the idiosyncratic noise is averaged away and the
common noise B0 is independent of B. Repeating (A.15) with (P, B0) in place of B0, and using
that (u,v, X(0)) is independent of (B, (B0,P)), we instead get
(Ll(P))(t) =
∫
R+×Rk×Rk
ulP(t ≥ τxu,v | B0,P)d$(x, u, v),
so there is potentially some extra randomness that has survived the limiting procedure. In other
words, we have mildly relaxed the criterion that the loss processes should strictly be conditional
on the common noise B0. For this reason, the limit thus obtained is called a ‘relaxed’ solution
to (5.13). Nevertheless, in cases where we have a pathwise uniqueness argument for (5.13) such
as in Section A.2 (the proof of Theorem 5.10), we can apply a Yamada-Watanabe argument as
in [Ledger and Søjmark, 2018b, Thm. 2.3] to ensure that P really is B0 measurable and that we
are hence only conditioning on the common noise B0.
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